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Introduction 
 
V.O. Key’s seminal work on party realignment spawned an entire field of research. 
During the 1950s, Key wrote three noted pieces on realignment. First, he introduced the term 
“party realignment” and its conditions. Second, he defined “secular realignment,” a “secular shift 
in party attachment” (Key 1959). Third, he established a new theory of “critical realignment,” 
specifically, those elections that reveal a “sharp alteration of the pre-existing cleavage within the 
electorate” (Key 1955).  
The concept of realignment itself has undergone several definitions. Some scholars 
describe it as a durable change in the issues that politically divide the nation (Sundquist 1983), 
while others focus on group and regional attachments to parties (Petrocik 1981). As a result, 
realignment theory has developed a reputation as ill-defined, and a few scholars think it ought to 
be scrapped altogether (Mayhew 2002, Carmines and Stimson 1989).  
For years, detractors of critical realignment theory seemed to have become the 
resounding voice within the disciple.
1
 Nevertheless, a new generation of scholars has emerged in 
an effort to revitalize the genre (Nardulli 1995, Nichols 2009). They acknowledge its empirical 
(and predictive) shortcomings and thus attempt to “restate” and “reimagine” the concept. It is 
from their spirit of renewal that I endeavor this research.   
Key’s theory on critical elections existed without the benefit of hindsight. Two major 
shifts occurred after his publications. First, black voters became even more integrated within the 
Democratic Party, overshadowing their peripheral role in the New Deal coalition to 
metaphorically become the party. Second, white Southerners, who showed movement as early as 
the sixties, didn’t become a permanent fixture in the Republican Party until the 1990s. These 
oversights, neither of which was “predicted” by Keys or other early scholars, became fodder for 
critics of critical realignment theory.  
                                                        
1 Nichols, Curt. “Reconsidering realignment from a systemic perspective.” Clio: The Newsletter of the Politics and 
History Section 19.2 (2009): 3. 
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Carmines and Stimson (1989) classify the inherent flaw of critical realignment theory as 
“prescientific,” too abstract and resilient to have any social scientific value. Empirical 
inconsistencies, they argue, undermine the theory’s ability to predict seismic shifts in the 
electorate. Scholars have instead used empirics to merely refine the concept, distorting its utility, 
and forming a literature that is a “long string of amendments by typology.”2 Mayhew (2004) 
agrees, arguing that the theory is nothing more than historical narrative. The literature on 
realignment, he claims, was “once a vibrant source of ideas” that is now an “impediment to 
understanding.”3  
Peter Nardulli (1995) does not generally disagree with Carmines and Stimson, but he is 
not prepared to drop the concept altogether. He argues that despite its scientific deficiencies, 
realignment research may yet still have theoretical value, and that fault lies with scholars who 
were too busy rushing to construct a broad theory that they neglected to scrutinize it properly.
4
 He 
finds that if appropriately defined “the concept of critical realignment is a powerful tool in the 
study of electoral behavior.”5  
Burnham (1970) developed a model of critical realignment that principally echoes that of 
punctuated equilibrium theory. That is, party realignments are broad and systemic, and are the 
result of “tension management.” He found that throughout American history there had been five 
party “systems”: Federalists v. Democratic-Republicans, 1794-1824, National Republicans/Whigs 
v. Democrats, 1828-1856, the Civil War System, 1860-1892, the System of ’96, 1896-1928, and 
the New Deal System, 1932-1964. Since, Sundquist (1983) has added a sixth (1968 dealignment 
of the South). Essentially, party systems are disrupted by single rapid-change events that alter the 
status quo. These changes, however, are made possible when mounting tensions force them to 
occur.  
                                                        
2 Carmines, Edward G., and James A. Stimson. Issue Evolution: Race and the Transformation of American Politics. 
Princeton University Press, 1989: 21-23. 
3 Mayhew, David R. Electoral Realignments: A Critique of an American Genre. Yale University Press, 2002: 5.  
4 Nardulli, Peter F. "The Concept of a Critical Realignment, Electoral Behavior, and Political Change." American 
Political Science Review 89.01 (1995): 11.  
5 Ibid.  
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Curt Nichols’s (2009) “reimagining” of realignment also uses punctuated equilibrium, 
claiming that realignment happens in three stages: Rising Entropy, the Realigning Tipping Point, 
and Reordering Politics. First, Nichols writes that accumulated entropy “causes the governing 
majority’s institutional regime to be seen as an impediment to both progress and necessary 
change.” When this happens, “past arrangements lose their relevance and politics have reached a 
realigning tipping point.”6 Second, the tipping point is the critical moment in which “structural 
constraints posed by the old order diminish,” allowing “partisan leaders to effectively repudiate 
the enervated status quo.” As a result, this “moves the pressure on the status quo to a much higher 
level and creates conditions of political crisis.”7 Next comes the “reordering opportunity,” in 
which a “casually tight chain of events that is nearly uninterruptible can be made to form a new 
governing majority by first shifting the main axis of partisan conflict and then outflanking 
political opponents to assemble a new majority coalition.”8 Last, if party leaders are successful, 
“systemic entropy should drop dramatically, and a new status quo will be established.”9  
Nichols, similar to many scholars, approaches realignment from the macro level.
10
 The 
literature focuses on ‘party systems,’ which are the “system of interactions resulting from inter-
party competition.”11 Their real interest lies in a broad predictive model, one that explains both 
past and future changes in party competition. Consequently, the groups within the parties are only 
acknowledged passively, as a means to justify conclusions. Very often scholars operating at a 
macro level get the general story correct, but the individual group stories wrong, relying on broad 
and biased interpretations of history and neglecting the nuances. For example, Hanes Walton, Jr. 
(1985) criticizes the “serious” and “methodological” problems in the literature on black voting 
                                                        
6 Nichols (2009): 3 
7 Ibid. 51 
8 Ibid.  
9 Ibid. 52 
10  It should be noted that other political science scholars have investigated group dynamics as related to party 
realignment. In his book Party Coalitions (1981), Petrocik finds that party coalitions that emerged from the New Deal 
realignment were constructed by race, class, region, nationality, and ethnicity. Later, Petrocik (1988) finds that 
“religious impulse” was also a feature of party coalitions. In the future, I intend to do more extensive research on those 
few scholars who did focus on groups rather than systems, particularly as I broaden the scope of my case studies and 
update my model.  
11 Sartori, Giovanni. Parties and Party Systems: A Framework for Analysis. ECPR press, 2005: xv.  
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behavior, which ignored, among other things, the data on black political independence and third-
party voting.
12
 Historians, such as Henry Blumenthal, Richard B. Sherman, and Christopher 
Waldrep, among others, have done a fine job of accurately telling stories on the black political 
experience, but their focus is sometimes too circumscribed, and their primary aim is not to 
necessarily add to political science realignment literature. I endeavor to focus on groups within 
party systems to focus on and enhance the concept of realignment. I fuse Burnham’s model of 
punctuated equilibrium with Nichols’s “reimagining” principles of realignment to create a four-
stage model of systematic causes of group realignment. This model includes two phases and two 
critical elections. In this thesis, I apply this four-stage model to a case study of black group 
realignment (1912-1964).  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                        
12 Walton, Hanes, Jr. Invisible Politics: Black Political Behavior. SUNY Press, 1985: 81-82.  
Figure 1 
 
 
5 
 
Four Stage Model  
 
Priming Phase 
 
 
Communications and media scholars have done extensive research on the subjects of 
framing, agenda setting, and priming. These models have been used to “tell theorists and 
researchers about the effects of mass media.”13 While framing and agenda setting may play a role 
in group realignment, in this paper, I focus on the prominence of priming, which Iyengar and 
Kinder (1987) describe as “changes in the standards that people use to make political 
evaluations.” Domke, Dhavan, and Wackman (1998) call it “the process by which activated 
mental constructs can influence how individuals evaluate other concepts and ideas.” The first 
period of my four-stage model is the priming phase.  
The priming phase is the period in which the group softens its perceptions of, 
conceptions of, and loyalties to, their aligned party. It is a synergistic phase. Thus, it features a 
combination of moving parts that all conspire to stimulate political change, and typically lasts 
fifteen-to-twenty years. Paul Beck (1974) writes that “manifestations of a decline in parties are 
apparent prior to each of the realignments in the past,” noting that an electorate is “ripe for 
realignment” as a result of “traumatic events.”14  
While borrowing some important definitional elements of the concept as it relates to 
group realignment, I argue that the media does not solely drive priming. Instead, the priming 
phase features five characteristics: Party Contrast, New Cohort Shift, Activist Shift, Media Shift, 
and Cross-Cutting Issue. 
 
Party Contrast  
 
 In order for priming to occur, the group must experience being governed by 
both major parties. This becomes fundamental because it allows the group to 
compare and contrast. Were they better off with the party of their allegiance 
                                                        
13 Scheufele, Dietram A., and David Tewksbury. "Framing, agenda setting, and priming: The evolution of three media 
effects models." Journal of communication57.1 (2007): 9-20. 
14 Beck, Paul Allen. “A Socialization Theory of Partisan Realignment.” The Politics of Future Citizens (1974): 406. 
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in power? Did they notice a difference between the parties? Priming only 
works if the group begins to lament the fact that there is no real difference 
between its “friend” and “foe.” Indeed, in some circumstances, the group 
may realize that its loyalty is not well spent, as the comparison may produce 
an even more unfavorable view of their aligned party than the opposition.  
 
New Cohort Shift  
 
 Priming also requires a new cohort to emerge and introduce fresh ideas and 
perspectives to their group. This new cohort is made up of younger voters 
who are coming of age in an environment rife with short-term forces that 
influence their political identities. It may also include formerly 
disenfranchised voters who migrate to a freer environment and adopt a new 
pattern of political behavior. This cohort will be far more willing to embrace 
political independence and reject old loyalties. They will also adopt a new 
“stream of consciousness” that will update and heighten group-awareness. A 
result of this is renewed group militancy, including lists of demands designed 
to disrupt the current order, as well as win political, social, and economic 
benefits for the group. It should be noted that this cohort is not always 
striving for a progressive agenda. Their “current order” may include 
revolutionary movement away from their desired establishment. Thus, fresh 
ideas could sometimes be interpreted as reactionary, and new perspectives 
may be construed as static or conservative in comparison to the broader, 
moving political environment. Inexperienced voters (whether young or 
formerly disenfranchised) are also subject to political manipulation. This 
may be in the form of short-term influences and/or charismatic leaders.  
 
Activist Shift 
 
 A shift in allegiance among group activists is also a primary feature of the 
priming phase. Nardulli (1995) argues that a “comprehensive theory of 
political change would have to incorporate a variety of catalytic agents.” 
These “agents of change” include government elites, social and economic 
leaders, party activists, and organized special interest groups. It is important 
to understand that during the priming phase, each of these agents act at 
varying degrees. They will not all, for example, shift en mass at the exact 
same time. After all, they do not all “respond similarly to the same stimuli.”15 
Government elites and party activists, who have a vested interest in the party 
of allegiance, will move slower, as they are “less likely to act on issues that 
would divide their core constituency.”16 Social and economic leaders, as well 
as special interest groups, however, are driven by results (be they symbolic 
or substantive). A mark of the priming phase is the very public divergence of 
these groups with their aligned party. They may begin to embrace “third-
way” options, which include the creation (or support) of third parties and 
independent organizations. Not unlike the new cohort, these groups may also 
begin to flirt with other dominant ideologies and reject the dichotomy of 
Democrat vs. Republican. Elite activists initiate the group shift because they 
are apt to articulate existing problems. They are the most extreme, invested, 
                                                        
15 Nardulli, Peter F. "The concept of a critical realignment, electoral behavior, and political change." American Political 
Science Review 89.01 (1995): 10-22. 
16 Ibid.  
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and knowledgeable contingent on issues important to their group. They are 
also the likely body to hold political leaders accountable for inaction and 
broken promises. When problems persist, they speak out. Aldrich (1995) 
argues “the political role [of party activists] is to attempt to constrain the 
actual leaders of the party, its ambitious office seekers, as they try to become 
the party-in-government by appealing to the electorate.”  
 
Media Shift  
 
 Another important characteristic of the priming phase is the influence of 
mass media on group perception and behavior. In keeping with the traditional 
view of priming, we must also include media shift. Viswanath and Arora 
(2000) argue that the media “reflect, refract, and amplify the concerns of 
power groupings in the social system,” continuing, “their primary function is 
social control, in the interest of system maintenance, which they perform by 
drawing attention to what is acceptable and not acceptable within the 
dominant norms and values of the community” (p. 41). Additionally, 
communications scholars claim that media “bias” is similarly reflected in 
how one constructs one’s beliefs about the world (Hawkins and Pingree 
1981). Features of media shift may include: increased editorial scrutiny from 
group newspapers (or more generally, news outlets) of the aligned party, 
positive mentions and added credit given to the opposition party, open 
hostility toward aligned party leadership, and calls for political 
independence. 
 
Crosscutting Issue  
 
 A crosscutting issue must exist during the priming phase. Specific issues can 
be used as benchmarks for “evaluating the performance of leaders and 
governments.”17 Again, the aligned party has to be seen as disinterested in 
fulfilling its promises to the group, and a crosscutting issue may encourage 
“flanking”. Miller and Schofield (2003) describe “flanking” as a motivation 
of candidates who want to win elections, enlisting “coalitions of disaffected 
voters, at the risk of alienating some of their traditional activist supporters.” 
As this dynamic plays out, the group begins to question its loyalty to their 
aligned party, recognizing that its leaders are attempting to play both sides of 
the fence, with little concern for (or power to) satisfy its political promises. 
In other words, the romance is over. The group realizes its beau’s propensity 
to wander and loses trust. It may not leave immediately, because another 
suitor is not readily available, but when given the opportunity, it will.  
 
Turning Point  
 
A turning point is the electoral consequence of a primed group. It is the first indication of 
a massive shift in voting behavior as a result of priming and short-term forces.  
                                                        
17 Scheufele, Dietram A., and David Tewksbury. "Framing, agenda setting, and priming: The evolution of three media 
effects models." Journal of Communication (2007): 9-20. 
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The turning point indicates a group’s shift in voting behavior during a critical election. It 
does not solely accept the traditional view of critical realignment as an “aggregate level concept 
that refers to an abrupt, large, and enduring form of change in prevailing electoral patterns, one 
that is initiated by a critical election and results in a significantly different partisan balance in the 
electorate.”18   Instead, as Peter Nardulli (1995) finds, critical realignments are “geographically 
concentrated phenomena that represent marked and enduring breaks in regional electoral 
patterns.” In other words, they are not always national movements. This is an important 
distinction because focusing solely on group support for national party figures may miss the more 
compelling tale. If as Speaker Tip O’Neil once wrote, “all politics is local,”19 then it might prove 
useful to focus on those regional electoral patterns too.  In the case of black Americans, whereas 
aggregated data shows that 1936 was a pivotal turning point in presidential politics, scholars 
should not ignore the local reality of black politics in the mid-30s. In Chicago, for example, black 
support for local Democrats consistently underperformed their backing of national Democratic 
aspirants until the early 1950s. Additionally, significant proportions of blacks were still voting 
(and calling themselves) Republican during and after 1936. These facts separate characteristics of 
the turning point and sealed realignment stages. Cowden and McDermott (2000), Howell (1981), 
and Boyd (1972), among others, have all found that short-term forces can have an effect on 
voting behavior. The turning point stage presupposes that this feature exists among a primed 
group.  
 
Settling Phase  
 
The settling phase has two major characteristics: Solidifying Pull Factors and a sizable, 
but dwindling Old Loyalty Base 
                                                        
18 Nardulli (1995): 11. 
19 This statement is derived from the title of his 1994 book with Gary Hymel, “All Politics is Local: And Other Rules of 
the Game.”  
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Solidifying Pull Factors 
 These factors may include the developing relationship between the group and 
dominant local political machine, emergence of political incorporation and 
self-representation within the newly aligned party structure, machine 
reinforcement of group enfranchisement and efficacy, and growth in material 
gains for the group as a result of their new allegiance.  
Old Loyalty Base 
 Old loyalists exist as representatives of the old coalition, continuing in their 
efforts to turn the group around. Their significance is not only in their 
numbers, but their status, and political voice. Some old loyalists are 
respected within the group community. They may own newspapers or hold 
political office and high status. They’re represented in the 20-30+ percent of 
the group who still consistently vote in favor of the old party. They also help 
to signify the shift in group allegiance from settling to sealed realignment.  
Sealed Realignment  
 
Sealed Realignment is the last stage of group realignment. It is triggered by a second 
critical election and its short-term forces: galvanizing the young cohort, permanently cementing 
the political class into the new party, and shaking the older cohort and loyalists away from the old 
regime. Where the settling phase shows incremental group immersion into a new coalition, a 
sealed realignment is characterized by its bluntness. That is, the trend lines authenticate this 
election as a group’s point of no return. 
 
Case Study: Black Group Realignment 1912-1964 
 
Priming Phase 
Party Contrast  
 
  
In 1912, Woodrow Wilson became the first Democrat elected to the presidency since 
1893. The Wilson Administration was no “friend of the Negro.” By many measures, namely the 
number of black lynchings, dwindling black federal political appointments, the “resegregation” of 
Washington D.C., and treatment of black leaders, Wilson and his administration lived up to the 
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reputation. As shown in Figure 2, on average, here were about 56 black lynchings per year during 
the Wilson Administration. 
Kathleen L. Wolgemuth (1959) finds that segregation in Washington D.C. had a “special 
significance,” as it was the “center of Negro society,” where blacks enjoyed a social status 
unparalleled with the rest of the nation. By 1914, for the first time since the mid-nineteenth 
century, segregation had  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
been realized in several important federal governmental departments. In the Bureau of Engraving 
and Printing, the Post Office, and the Office of the Auditor for the Post Office, blacks and whites 
were “separated or screened-off” in working positions, lavatories, and lunchrooms. 20  This 
development was a “conspicuous reversal of a fifty year tradition of integrated civil service.”21 By 
1915, as a result of firing and a refusal to hire, significant federal offices held by blacks were 
                                                        
20 Wolgemuth, Kathleen L. "Woodrow Wilson and federal segregation." Journal of Negro History (1959): 158-173. 
21 Weiss, Nancy J. "The Negro and the New Freedom: Fighting Wilsonian Segregation." Political science 
quarterly (1969): 61-79. 
Figure 2 
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reduced from twenty-four posts to seven.
22
 In lieu of appointments to significant posts, steps were 
being taken to “appoint Negroes only to menial posts or to restrict them from obtaining civil 
service jobs.”23 Hiring officers would require applicants to provide photographs (in the guise of 
“preventing impersonation”) in order to weed out blacks. Additionally, hiring officers also used 
the long-standing practice of choosing their staff replacements from a pool of three names to 
exclude blacks. None of these policies were articulated as blatant discrimination. On the contrary, 
they were said to be in the interest of avoiding friction in federal services.
24
 Nevertheless, this 
was not persuasive for many black leaders.  
While Wilson campaigned on giving a “fair dealing” to black Americans, it was not 
difficult to question the sincerity of his claim. In 1916, for example, after being reelected, Wilson 
told the New York Times, “If the colored people made a mistake in voting for me, they ought to 
correct it.”25 Booker T. Washington lamented, “I have recently spent several days in Washington 
and have never seen the colored people so discouraged and so bitter as they are at the present 
time.”26 A White House private screening of the controversial D.W. Griffith film The Birth of a 
Nation
27
 elicited outrage and protest and Wilson’s own defense of segregation as “humanitarian” 
also troubled black leaders and media. Blumenthal (1963) argues that Wilson’s primary agitation 
with the “race question” was related to politics. His party was still very much led by Southern 
white forces who were “Negrophobe” and forcing the social evolution of blacks at a “greater 
speed than Wilson thought the Negro masses were either educationally or vocationally prepared 
to maintain” irritated the Democrat. Nonetheless, even after accomplishing his favored reforms, 
Wilson’s “continued reluctance to take an active interest in the Negroes’ fight for civil rights and 
                                                        
22 Ibid. 
23 Wolgemuth (1959): 161. 
24 Ibid. 
25 Blumenthal, Henry. "Woodrow Wilson and the Race Question." Journal of Negro History (1963): 14. 
26 Weiss (1969): 64. 
27 The Birth of a Nation, based on a popular 1905 book called The Clansman (a sentimental novel on the “plight” of 
whites during Reconstruction), was celebrated by Southerners because it depicted the antebellum South as a “golden 
age” in which “feudal agrarianism provided the good life for wealthy, leisured, kindly, aristocratic owners and loyal, 
happy, obedient slaves” (Everett Carter 1960) (350).  Furthermore, Nation portrayed black and “mulatto” men as 
“bestial” and “unrestrained,” cosigning popular myths they are sexual deviants and a danger to white women (353).   
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liberties left little doubt that more than political pressures kept him from seeking social justice for 
the colored people.”28 
Even as some were mildly encouraged as Wilson campaigned for the presidency, blacks 
were not entirely surprised by their treatment at the hands of the Wilson Administration. After all, 
given the general tenor of the Democratic Party, expectations were tempered. The party, led by 
Southern whites, had no room in its agenda for black civil rights measures. It had, since 
Reconstruction, evolved instead into a quasi-confederate force. The real shock rested in the 
incremental evolution of the “party of Lincoln” on racial issues. Republican “progressivism,” as 
administered by the Roosevelt and Taft presidencies, nurtured black discontent with the party. By 
the 1920s, during the height of Republican control of government, this dissatisfaction only grew, 
as the party began looking and sounding more racially conservative.  
In the 1920s Republican Party, the position of the mainstream party and its vote-
maximizers was not aligned with black voters. On policy issues ranging from black appointments 
to leadership positions, to black self-representation, to anti-lynching legislation, the GOP brass 
were unwilling to budge. In three Republican administrations, blacks were dissatisfied with the 
party’s blasé treatment of black issues.  
As early as 1922, in a speech given in Birmingham, Alabama, President Warren G. 
Harding declared, “Social equality between whites and Negroes there cannot be.”29 The Chicago 
Defender, a Chicago-based black newspaper with national prominence, called him the “saddest 
figure in all the annals of government,” accusing him of turning his back on every black, driving 
him out of the party, turning him out of the government, and stripping him of “every vestige of 
dignity as a citizen.”30 In other words, Harding was not much of a marked improvement from the 
Wilson years, except of course, he and the Republicans were supposed to be a “friend.”  
                                                        
28 Blumenthal (1963): 20-21 
29 The Chicago Defender (National edition) (1921-1967); Apr 3, 1926; ProQuest Historical Newspapers  (1910-1975): 
A8 
30 The Chicago Defender (National edition) (1921-1967); May 30, 1931; ProQuest Historical Newspapers (1910-1975): 
14 
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One measure of improvement is evident. During the Republican administrations, black 
lynchings did decrease.
31
 Below, Figure 1 shows that from 1922-1933, there were about 19 (on 
average) black lynchings per year. That is a reduction of about 36 lynchings per year from the 
Wilson era.  
 
Figure 3 
 
 
Nevertheless, times were different, and expectations shifted: Republican Congressman Leonidas 
Dyer introduced a federal anti-lynching bill in Congress. Blacks (and some liberal whites) 
expected passage, but many Republicans dragged their feet, and the party suffered further damage 
to its reputation.  
As a candidate for president, Herbert Hoover advocated a “Southern Strategy.” At the 
1928 Republican National Convention, his aids openly supported the promotion of white 
Southerners to important committees. In turn, black politicians consistently found themselves at a 
                                                        
31 A more detailed account of black lynchings will be discussed in the section on Cross-Cutting Issues.  
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disadvantage. The GOP platform in 1928 paid little mention to black concerns, merely devoting a 
single line to federal anti-lynching legislation.
32
 Hoover’s generic rhetoric on the subject of race 
also made it difficult for blacks to vigorously support him, as it played too neatly into perceptions 
that he was truly only interested in placating white Southerners in an effort to win the South. 
Furthermore, in 1928, when Hoover interjected himself into a local political scandal in 
Mississippi, his allegiances with white Southerners seemed all the more evident. When black 
national committeeman Perry Howard was prosecuted for the sale of federal offices (not an 
unprecedented practice for the times), his was a political indictment to be used by national 
Republicans to curry favor with Southern white voters. In essence, Howard was Hoover’s “Sista 
Souljah” moment, 33  as he openly chastised Southern blacks for “blackmailing” Republican 
officials in the South for patronage jobs.
34
 In 1931, the New York Times reported on Hoover’s call 
for reform of Republican organizations in Mississippi, South Carolina, and Georgia. He declared 
that they must “clean house” or get no offices.35 The Chicago Defender interpreted “clean house” 
to mean the cleaning out of black chairman, secretaries, committeemen, etc. from the Republican 
organization. “The trouble in Georgia, Mississippi, and South Carolina is not in the leadership of 
the Republican Party,” its editors wrote, but “wholly traceable to the cowardly desertion by the 
Republican Party of the colored people.”36  
                                                        
32 Sherman, Richard B. The Republican Party and Black America from McKinley to Hoover, 1896-1933. University 
Press of Virginia, 1973. 229. 
33 On May 13, 1992, Sista Souljah, a young black female rapper, made controversial remarks to a Washington Post 
journalist regarding the Los Angeles riots. She remarked, “I mean, if black people kill black people every day, why not 
have a week and kill white people? You understand what I’m saying? In other words, white people, this government 
and that mayor were well aware of the fact that black people were dying every day in Los Angeles under gang violence. 
So if you’re a gang member and you would normally be killing somebody, why not kill a white person? Do you think 
that somebody thinks that white people are better, or above dying when they would kill their own kind” (B1)? When 
then-candidate for president, Bill Clinton, responded with, “If you took the words, ‘white’ and ‘black’ and you reversed 
them, you might think David Duke was giving that speech,” the “Sista Souljah” moment was created. Essentially, this 
“moment” is a “calculated denunciation of an extremist position or special interest group” by a candidate for office 
(Boston Globe, September 16, 2007). It is used to convince voters that the candidate is centrist and attract support from 
across the political spectrum.  
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When in 1929 the Florida Republican Party passed a resolution barring all but white 
voters from voting in its primary, it was yet another indicator that the Republicans were “on a 
plane with the Democratic [party] as far as dark voters are concerned.”37 Once Hoover was 
elected president, the National Association for the Advancement of Colored People (NAACP) 
had further complaints about Hoover’s lack of appointing blacks to positions of power. In fact, 
like Harding and Coolidge, Hoover failed to restore blacks to the “number of positions in the 
Executive Departments that they had held before Wilson’s presidency.”38 NAACP official Walter 
White charged that Hoover could only be addressed as “The Man in the Lily White House”.39  
Hoover’s “flanking” was seen as egregious, but ultimately it was indicative of a larger movement 
among Republicans to rid itself of the coalitional albatross that hindered its ability to play in the 
South.  
Locally, the divergence of blacks and Republicans was also taking shape. For example, 
black women (particularly activists found in women’s organizations) played a role in widening 
this cleavage. Coleman (1997) writes that early twentieth-century black women “began to 
articulate an aspect of black self-determination that had been all but ignored.”40 Hendricks (1998) 
notes the impact black female political activists had in not only shifting party loyalty rhetoric, but 
also in emboldening black politicians to run for offices outside of the Republican Party. She 
writes, “The promotion of black female political activism in Chicago” had “immediate effects.”41 
First, these activists were non-partisan and adamant about supporting black candidates for office. 
Second, “black male politicians who had long been disgruntled about their lack of power within 
the white-dominated Republican Party viewed the female vote as an opportunity to shed their 
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confinement by both the party line and the party’s patronizing posture.”42 Similarly, the erosion 
of the relationship between blacks and the GOP was furthered by white women’s organizations. 
Higginbotham (1997) cites these 1920s white women’s Republican groups for “black women’s 
discontent” with the Republican Party, and credits them with hastening blacks to form “new 
leaders, alliances, and strategies” in the 1930s.43 
By 1928, black discontent with local Republicans in Cincinnati began to rear its head. 
Long a force in machine politics, Republicans, led by Boss George B. Cox, dominated the city 
since the late nineteenth century. In 1924, however, reform-minded Republicans, Democrats, and 
Independents attempted to stifle the power of the machine by forming the Chamber City 
Committee.
44
 Its goal was to establish a city manager system of government and create a city 
council to be elected by proportional representation (PR). Despite machine opposition, a charter 
was passed, and immediately gave black voters a chance to elect members of their own race. 
Before the PR system, there had already been a growing rift between black wards and the 
Republican machine, as blacks saw themselves shut out from leadership positions. When the local 
GOP nominated candidates for office, it refused to select black candidates for black wards, 
causing both activist and media elites to begin speaking out. The Cincinnati Journal, a local 
influential black newspaper, editorialized that blacks were but “tools” for the local Republican 
machine, nothing more than a few thousand loyal votes that did not need to be persuaded. 
Because Republicans also failed to dole out a fair share of high-paying city government and 
patronage jobs to black citizens, the paper further argued that the “greatest zenith [of a black 
man] is to get protection at the courts and run immoral dens’ to debauch our race.”45 As a result, 
the paper openly questioned black loyalty to Republicans and urged “intelligent” blacks to 
support the “good government” Chamber City Committee in 1924.  
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Some black male activists were also troubled by Republican treatment of blacks and no 
less willing to publicly question political loyalty to the party. William Ware, chairman of the 
Universal Negro Political Union, echoed calls from “radical” black activists in cities across the 
country tired of being represented by white men in government. He argued that “20th Century 
Negroes” could not be represented by white men, and openly acknowledged a changing tide 
within black communities across the country when he said, “You are dealing with a different type 
of Negro than in the past. We’re no longer willing to vote any way that the Ward Healers would 
tell them to vote in order that they might get a minor job, or a few dollars and a box of cigars.”46 
He lamented white Republicans too, accusing them of never failing to mention black voters of 
their indebtedness to Abraham Lincoln, while knowing little about him. His representation 
prediction became even more evident by 1929, when black candidate for city council Frank A. B. 
Hall, a retired police officer, ran as an independent (the Republicans refused to endorse him) and 
siphoned away a substantial amount of black votes from the GOP ticket. Burnham (1997) claims, 
“his candidacy represented a kind of protest against the relationship that had developed between 
the Republican organization and the black community.” In 1931, recognizing the political error of 
their ways, the Republicans endorsed Hall, but it proved too late. In Cincinnati, as it began 
showing nationally, local Republicans were out of touch with their black constituents, and while 
the Democrats were at present nonexistent (or still openly hostile), black elites began to develop 
openness for political independence, perfectly illustrating characteristics of the priming phase.  
For black activists, the subject of black self-representation was a problem the Republican 
Party showed no interest in solving. Like in Cincinnati, local Republican organizations had long-
held expectations that black ward voters would support the “Party of Lincoln” no matter who they 
nominated to represent them. Because of this, white Republican bosses were apt to promote white 
politicians to represent black wards. In Pittsburgh, for example, local Republicans awarded blacks 
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with only the least desirable patronage jobs,
47
 and white chainmen controlled all four black 
wards.
48
 In the early part of the century, this was a tenable system. In most cities, blacks were not 
a large enough population to cause much trouble for white machine bosses. Black wards were to 
be ignored. Nonetheless, when women gained the vote, suddenly they “seized the moment to 
center themselves in the political discourse and demonstrated their ability to reshape, redirect, and 
strengthen their community’s political influence.”49 In Chicago, organized black women (or club 
women) not only added to the black bloc, but they “awakened the black community to its ability 
to determine how best to advance the race,” symbolizing “the black community’s political 
liberation from white ward bosses.”50 For example, in a 1915 race for Chicago alderman, women 
cast more than one-third of the votes of eventual winner, Oscar DePriest.
51
 Aware of their 
contribution to his victory, DePriest publicly asserted that he was in favor of extending the right 
of suffrage to women because they “cast as intelligent a vote as the men.”52  
By 1928, many black elites echoed the sentiments of W.E.B. Du Bois when speaking on 
the presidential contest between Herbert Hoover and Al Smith. He said, “In my humble opinion, 
it does not matter a tinker’s damn which of these gentlemen succeed. With minor exceptions, they 
stand for exactly the same thing: oligarchy in the South, color caste in national office holding, and 
recognition of the rule of organized wealth.”53  
Indeed, by the late 1920s, many blacks began coming to expect exactly what DuBois 
articulated. “Year after year,” wrote the Defender, “we have gone to polls and have marked our 
cross in the column headed Republican, while that party has moved farther and farther away from 
the principles which promoted its being. Year after year we have added our weight to the 
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numbers necessary to man the White House and the halls of Congress, and our own efforts have 
been used to heap greater indignities upon our heads.”54 
Given the opportunity to compare and contrast between the previous Democratic 
administration and the “GOP Three,” the Defender was not seeing a difference as far as realizing 
the interests of the group: 
   
Today, with segregation, disenfranchisement, lynchings, peonage, 
bastardly and all other forms of humiliation facing us, the Republicans 
are in control of government. With segregated beaches in Washington, 
with the government flaunting segregation signs in our faces under the 
dome of the nation’s capitol, the Republicans are in control. With a 
Republican majority in the United States Congress, as it has been almost 
uninterruptedly for a quarter of a century, anti-lynching bills are scoffed 
at and laughed out of both houses. With the Ku Klux Klan parading up 
and down the public highways of Washington, the Republicans are in 
control.
55
  
 
  
By 1932, the Defender was declaring that “no longer” could blacks look to Republicans 
to embody the “high principles of manhood rights.”56 Herbert Hoover had “furnished the first real 
opportunity for the black man to escape the clutches of Republican treachery.”57 Republicans had 
failed to pass major civil rights legislation, failed on reversing Wilson’s precedent of appointing 
few blacks to significant federal posts, failed at galvanizing dispirited blacks at the local machine 
level, and failed to convince blacks that their loyalty would be duly compensated. The 1920s 
demonstrated “Republican treachery,” offering blacks an opportunity to compare and contrast a 
decade of GOP control with the Wilson era and find little to praise. Party contrast did the 
Republicans no favors.
58
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New Cohort Shift  
 
 
Contemporary scholars have split on the sources of partisan realignment. Among them, 
two major hypotheses (mobilization and conversion) developed in their attempt to explain how 
realignments occur and who in the electorate realigned (Campbell 1985).  
The mobilization hypothesis argues that party strength shifts is the result of new voters 
entering the electorate. New voters (those who may have been previously too young to vote, 
ineligible, or immigrants) are mobilized to participate and form a new majority party coalition. 
Petrocik and Brown (1999) note the “large impact of electoral mobilization” in party systems, 
concluding that the “historical record clearly demonstrates” a “characteristic bias which, in 
virtually every case, resulted in one or a few of the parties benefiting disproportionately.”59 
Salisbury and MacKuen (1981) agree, stating “the process of mobilization and demobilization 
whereby party organizations, candidate appeals and issue salience pull people over the threshold 
of indifference to become voters, or alternatively, let them slide back, have important effects on 
electoral outcomes.”60 And Northup (1987) finds that young cohorts (and independents) were 
mobilized to form the new Republican coalition of the 1980s.  
Campbell (1985) writes, “the conversion hypothesis claims that realignments result 
largely from established voters switching their partisan allegiances to the new majority party. 
Established voters by virtue of their size and increased loyalty to the new majority party 
contribute more to the party’s gain than do new voters who enter the process.”61 In looking at the 
period of 1928-1936, Erikson and Tedin (1981) posit that the “Democratic vote surge of the New 
Deal era resulted from the vote switching of established voters.”62 Indeed, on the subject of black 
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group realignment, Grimshaw (1992) states that blacks “forged a Democratic majority mainly 
through conversion – the transformation of Republican into Democrats.” 63  He cites Kristi 
Anderson’s (1979) Chicago study that found that while other city groups – Poles, Italians, Jews, 
Swedes, Germans, and Czechs - switched at the onset of the 1930s, “blacks shifted in a distinctive 
way.”64  
 Although scholars split on these hypotheses, I reject the dichotomy. The story of black 
group realignment cannot be explained without elements of each. Weiss (1983) writes that “the 
experience of blacks fits both of the models which political scientists use to explain the New Deal 
realignment: the conversion of previously Republican voters to Democrats, and the mobilization 
of previously apolitical citizens who simultaneously entered the political arena and acquired a 
party identification.”65 New Cohort Shift, for example, borrows from the mobilization hypothesis. 
Later, data describing the turning point and sealed realignment will provide evidence for 
conversion. Indeed, a dichotomy cannot exist as a part of this four-stage model. The priming 
phase is but one stage. It does not explain mass voter behavior as attempted by the conversion 
hypothesis. Instead, it explains a shift in voter perceptions. It precedes actual realignment.  
A new cohort, as a part of this story, plays a more fundamental role during this phase. In 
the 1920s, the new black cohort produced emerging leaders that introduced radical ideas of 
political independence that had an immediate effect on the initial black group realignment. The 
advent of black labor organizations, communist groups, socialist thinkers, and race leaders 
brought about a fresh “stream of consciousness” that advocated an updated sense of “blackness.” 
It was this militant group of thinkers  
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and activists who articulated priming phase frustrations with Republicans, Democrats, and the 
reigning political, economic, and social order of the era. These “New Negroes”, who emerged 
between 1915 and 1925, transcended “the older ideological disputes” and developed “a more 
pragmatic approach to the problems that the black community faced.”66 By the 1920s, old guard 
black leadership in the vein of Booker T. Washington, began speaking to (and for) a “dwindling 
and rather self-conscious minority.”67  
Second within this cohort were “previously apolitical citizens.” As a result of the Great 
Migration, many southern black transplants began crowding northern cities, experiencing for the 
first time the allure of black-consciousness rhetoric, having lived under (or witnessed their 
parents endure) oppressive conditions in the South. The collapse of cotton had depressed 
employment opportunities for black farmers, and northern industry created a “pull factor” that 
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precipitated this move. Between 1910 and 1930, nearly a million and a half black migrants 
traveled north to New York, Pennsylvania, Illinois, Michigan, and Ohio.
68
 For many, the North 
represented a “promised land.”69 Once north, however, the honeymoon didn’t last long. Faced 
with competing for jobs with other ethnic minorities and racist elements within the labor industry, 
as well as poor education, limited skills, lack of financial resources, and the “psychological 
burden of color,” blacks were only met with a new set of problems.70 Hanes Walton (1972) writes 
that the “urbanization of blacks” created a “quest for community,” “new social values,” and a 
“concern for the security, safety, and the opinions of other.”71  
Activist Shift  
 
 
As blacks adjusted to urban life, and crises mounted regarding poor conditions for black 
workers, housing, and political viability, the “New Negroes” emerged as a voice for a rising tenor 
of social militancy, impatience, and political action. These new voices, such as A. Philip 
Randolph, Cyril Briggs, Marcus Garvey, Angelo Herndon, and W.E.B. Du Bois, among others, 
did not, however, speak in unison. While some advocated for existing third parties like the 
Communists and Progressives, others called for a creation of black and tan parties, protest, and 
still others promoted black ticket splitting between the two major parties. Nevertheless, they all 
called for (and contributed to) a growth in black consciousness during the priming phase, 
providing an outlet for the disaffected, and, like in the case of the early-labor voices, paving the 
way for black inclusion into labor politics and the New Deal coalition.  
One such prominent voice of that era was A. Phillip Randolph, a pioneering black labor 
activist and editor of The Messenger magazine who used his pulpit for a number of causes: to 
denounce the “inherent” racism of the capitalist system, win equal conditions for black labor 
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workers, castigate the leading political parties, and promote black consciousness. In a written 
critique on the “cause of lynching,” Randolph credited capitalism as the root cause. He wrote, 
“Both black and white farmers are fleeced by this financial system [in the South]. But white and 
black farmers won’t combine against a common foe on account of race prejudice. Race 
antagonism, then, is profitable to those who own the farms, the mills, the railroads and the 
banks.”72 He charged that because prejudice is the chief weapon in the South, capitalists take heed 
in exploiting both races. Socialism, he argued, would end capitalist profiteering because it 
eliminates the incentive of pandering to and promotion of race prejudice and antagonism. He 
concluded, “Workingmen and women of my race don’t allow Republican and Democratic leaders 
to deceive you. They [Republican and Democratic leadership] are paid by Rockefeller, Morgan, 
Armour, Carnegie, owners of Southern railroads, coal mines, lumber mills, turpentine stills, 
cotton-plantations, etc., who make millions out of your labor.”73 Even if an anti-lynching bill 
becomes law, he claims, it cannot be trusted because “it will never be enforced” by “Republican 
and Democratic representatives, who profit from lynching; who want lynching to continue. 
Lynching will not stop until Socialism comes.”74 
Socialism never came, even after the Socialist Party in the 1920s changed its adverse 
position toward blacks. The party called upon white workers to “treat Negroes as equals, to 
encourage Negro unionism, and to help break down anti-Negro prejudice.” 75  Its influence 
ultimately failed, however, because it offered nothing special to blacks, instead assuming that the 
“uplift of the white worker would automatically emancipate the black worker.”76 Nonetheless, 
Randolph’s influence was not compromised. Even while he continued to stump for the socialists, 
he won victories for black labor in the ‘30s and ‘40s by mobilizing large protests of workers and 
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pressuring political authority. “The time has come,” Randolph said to a gathering of black 
laborers, “when the Negro has to decide between organized labor and organized capital.”77 
 Black communists, similar to their socialist counterparts, also played a small but 
significant role in fanning the flames of black discontent in the 1920s. Cyril Briggs, editor of 
popular Crusader magazine, merged “Black Nationalism with revolutionary socialism and 
introduced the twentieth-century global revolutionary tide to black America.” 78  Briggs’s 
magazine was dedicated to a “renaissance of Negro power and culture throughout the world.”79 
Angelo Herndon, a famous political prisoner in the early-1930s, who was sentenced to 18 to 20 
years on the chain gang on charges of inciting insurrection, wrote a public letter in honor of the 
Communist party. Until the Supreme Court freed Herndon, his case attracted support from 
diverse quarters, and his writing “reveals more vividly” the “Communist appeal for those working 
class blacks who did join its ranks.”80 Herndon wrote, “My parents and grand-parents were hard-
boiled Republicans, and told me very often that Lincoln had freed the slaves, and that we’d have 
to look to the Republican Party for everything good. I began to wonder about that. Here I was, 
being Jim-crowed and cheated. Every couple of weeks I read about lynching somewhere in the 
South. Yet there sat a Republican government up in Washington, and they weren’t doing a thing 
about it.”81 Instead, despite scare tactics from Birmingham foremen, “big-shot Negroes,” and 
Yankees, talked about how “reds” believed in killing people, and would get him into a lot of 
trouble. Herndon “got a few ideas clear about the Reds.” They “believed in organizing and 
sticking together. They believed that we didn’t have to have bosses on our backs. They believed 
that Negroes ought to have equal rights with whites.” 82  Walton (1969) cautions that the 
Communist Party ultimately had little impact on the black community electorally, but it did offer 
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blacks “an opportunity, when other doors were closed, to deplore the racist factor in American 
politics.”83 Its focus on the “race question” and position as an uncompromising defender of black 
rights (after all, in 1932, it nominated a black man as its presidential candidate) encouraged black 
involvement in the form of protest, not on the principles of the party.
84
 
Marcus Garvey and his popular Universal Negro Improvement Association (UNIA) was 
another indicator of an emerging leadership. The UNIA had mass appeal. Its “heady talk of race 
pride provided a much needed balm to those souls who had suffered for so long at the hands of 
arrogant, racist whites.”85In 1922, Garvey went to Detroit, attracting thousands of blacks to watch 
his parade and hear him speak, and alarmed the local establishment. The Garvey-led UNIA, a 
back-to-Africa, Black Nationalist organization, was short-lived (effectively ending in 1927, after 
Garvey’s deportation to Jamaica), but it “left its mark on the self-consciousness” of blacks in 
Detroit, and around the country.
86
  
Physical protest also became a part of black long-term strategies against poor treatment 
by local, state, and federal government official practices, as well as the two major parties. In his 
book Life for Us Is What We Make It, Richard W. Thomas cites 1915 through 1945 in Detroit, 
when “black protest took as many forms as there were incidents of racial discrimination.”87 
Members of this generation, many whom were recent migrants, refused to allow racial barriers to 
go unchallenged. Influenced by W.E.B. DuBois, the NAACP, publications like the Chicago 
Defender and Detroit Tribune, as well as the aforementioned Garvey and Randolph, this 
generation embraced a more hard-edged, radical view of politics and protest, disorienting the old 
unyielding loyalty to the “Party of Lincoln.” 
 DuBois, a chief black intellectual and editor of Crisis magazine, was an outspoken critic 
of, among other things, racism in labor and politics. He was also a leader in establishing black 
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consciousness. In 1924, his magazine encouraged black readers to “knife them at the polls,” by 
defeating Republican enemies and electing Democratic friends. He asked them to “play the 
political game with knowledge and brains.”88 In 1936, echoing sentiment among socialists, he 
argued that black workers could only find the “surest way to economic security” by teaming with 
white workers to bargain for security for everyone.  
DuBois also took a leading role in the “Negro Sanhedrin” in the early 1920s, a national 
conference of black civic organizations, leaders, and groups “aimed at developing greater 
cooperation among them on political matters.”89 Here, leaders strongly emphasized black pride, 
black consciousness, and the need for black unity. Kelly Miller, Dean at a historically black 
university, Howard University, called the conference because the “Negro question is a problem of 
psychology.”90 Unity, he argued, would compel race consciousness to “necessarily arise under 
compulsion of external circumstances.”91  Kelly, forecasting the brewing angst of his people, 
predicted that “within the next half generation,” there would be a “tremendous change.”92 Indeed, 
the purpose of his “Sanhedrin” was to bring to bear “purposive intelligence” to give this growing 
movement of “New Negroes” “orderliness and direction.”93 
 Many blacks sought to order that movement, not in labor unions, protests, or intellectual 
conferences, but in the formation of black and tan parties.
94
 Indeed, while black and tan 
candidates had existed long before this era, data show a spike in them, starting in 1920. That year 
especially, the Texas black and tan candidate for governor received nearly 30,000 votes.
95
 In his 
book Invisible Politics, Hanes Walton, Jr. writes, “with the rise of new black politics, the 
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increasing number of black candidates has intensified black participation in campaigning.”96 He 
shows eleven of nineteen black and tan Republican candidates running before blacks shifted to 
the New Deal, and claims that “black political mavericks” spearhead political movements, paving 
the way for “black political independents.”97 Other black independent parties of the era, the 
National Labor Congress (1924), and National Negro Congress (1936) also lasted a short while, 
but nonetheless played a role in organized black protest activity against lily-white Republicans 
and the current party system.  
Media Shift  
 
Communications scholars have oft-cited theories on “social reality” (a person’s 
interpretation of the world around them) and tied them to the role of the media.
98
 Additionally, 
they claim that media “bias” is similarly reflected in how a person constructs their beliefs about 
the world.
99
 Since the establishment of the first black newspaper in 1827, the black press had 
successfully framed intra-group mores, politics, and allegiances with powerful words of 
persuasion. It is thus important to note the role it played during the priming phase. 
To famed nineteenth-century black journalists John B. Russwurm and Samuel Cornish, 
the black press was to be a “defender of the race,” ready to counter attacks on blacks from the 
white press, and to make the case for black equality.
100
 With this mission, black media, 
particularly the militant wing, often found itself the victim of white mob attacks and public 
castigation from white politicians. In that, black editors knew that their content had far-reaching 
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influence (with readership from both races) and could “define the terms of debate as they 
wished.”101  
Black newspapers, including the Chicago Defender, Cleveland Gazette, New York Age, 
Richmond Planet, Detroit Tribune, Savannah Tribune, Boston Guardian, California Eagle, 
Chicago Board Ax, Indianapolis Freeman, Washington Bee, and Crisis all represented a cross-
section of black media in the early-twentieth century. These papers served as organs for black 
activist opinion, and particularly in the 1920s, they articulated “New Negroism,” black 
consciousness, and black self-help to a new generation of black citizens. Crisis, for example, was 
known as a monthly organ of the NAACP. In Detroit, the black newspaper was an institution with 
immense influence. They represented the “only means of communication beyond the information-
gathering social centers such as barbershops, poolrooms, and churches.” 102  Swedish social 
scientist Gunnar Myrdal (1944) claimed that the major function of the black newspaper was to be 
an “organ of protest,” and that by fulfilling its “propaganda function,” it helped create and 
maintain “group solidarity.”103 
This parallel “radicalism” of “New Negroes” and black media cannot be ignored. While 
independent political organizations were being formed in the 1910s and activist opinion began to 
shift, the black press was also beginning to cleavage on the issue of party loyalty. Many papers, 
who William G. Jordan (2001) coins “Agitators,” advocated “political activism and 
independence.” Calvin Chase, editor of the Washington Bee, echoed sentiments made by the 
Negro Independent Political League, calling for blacks to play off each party and split their votes. 
Editors for the Chicago Ax openly denounced Booker T. Washington for his famed 
accommodationist philosophy toward whites and unyielding loyalty to the GOP.
104
 Publisher of 
the Cleveland Gazette, Harry C. Smith, provides further insight into how black media “worked to 
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shape” black public opinion.105 Smith’s disenchantment with the Republican Party was robust, 
and he used his platform to openly advocate for black political independence in his paper. 
Kenneth L. Kusmer (1976) credits Smith with “helping to lay the groundwork” for black 
rebellion against the GOP. In 1912, William Monroe Trotter’s Boston Guardian openly 
campaigned for Woodrow Wilson, a move that would eventually backfire. Trotter and the 
Guardian were embarrassed, and by the 1920s, when black migration to Washington D.C., 
Harlem, and Chicago materialized, he and his paper lost most of its influence.
106
 Nonetheless, by 
1928, several influential black newspapers abandoned the Republican standard-bearer and 
endorsed Al Smith for president. Among them: the Baltimore Afro-American, the Norfolk 
Journal and Guide, the Guardian, and the Chicago Defender.
107
 In 1930, the Philadelphia 
Tribune and Defender accused the Republican federal government of “fostering, condoning, and 
supporting discrimination.” Defender editors wrote, “The great wave of intolerance that is 
sweeping the country has its source in the White House, presided over by Herbert Clark Hoover, 
Republican.”108  
During the 1920s and early 30s, the Defender had an immense readership. With a 
circulation well above 100,000, its open and often castigation of Republicans (and particularly 
their lily-white policies) was a notable sign of the deepening dissatisfaction between black media, 
black voters, and the GOP.
109
 In a 1924 editorial titled “Nearing the End”, the paper chastised 
President Coolidge for allowing himself to fall “under the magic spell of that little band of 
Democratic office-seekers called lily-white Republicans.”110 It declared “political independence” 
at the polls that year, making a credible case that the real fault line of racial inequality was 
actually regional. That is, northern Democrats like Robert Wagner (candidate for governor) were 
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worthy of black support, but Idaho Republican William Borah and his ilk were not. In 1931, the 
Defender claimed Hoover was a “very sad disappointment to Colored Republicans,” and he could 
“afford to be ashamed of what he has been influenced to do by the Klan and the Lilies.”111 In 
addition to protest, and in concert with the growing militancy, the Defender devised a list of 
demands for both parties: one-eighth of all emoluments should be given to the race, voting 
franchise be given to the millions of black people in the South, induce private industry to hire 
blacks “in proportion to the population,” pass legislation requiring labor unions to include blacks, 
put a stop to lynching, and “develop a true regard for the needs of the black race and take steps to 
advance those needs.”112 
In 1932, while most small black newspapers remained loyal to the president, the largest 
and most influential either openly endorsed Roosevelt (and attacked Hoover) or refused to 
endorse a candidate.
113
 Still, despite calls from the press, black voters remained skeptical of the 
Democratic Party and continued to support Hoover.
114
 Their concern was realized due to Franklin 
D. Roosevelt’s own deficiencies as a candidate on issues related to race, as well as the 
Democratic Party’s own reputational problems. Nevertheless, by 1934, papers like the Defender 
began giving Democrats credit where it was due. In an editorial titled “Lincoln is Finally Dead”, 
the paper noted that Democrats in the North, East, and West had put into practice a “real genuine 
definition and interpretation of democracy” by slating black candidates on various tickets across 
the country. In addition to former Republican papers shifting allegiance, a rash of unapologetic 
Democratic publications began developing large followings. Established in 1936, the Michigan 
Chronicle, a radical and pro-labor publication, developed for itself a “new” constituency. The 
paper consciously took an ideological leap away from the “old, tried and tested political 
orthodoxy, with its heavy dependency upon the Republican Party, the industrial elites, and black 
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capitalism” to the Democrats and unionism, and quickly emerged as the single-handedly most 
influential black publication in Detroit.
115
 The Philadelphia Independent became a leading voice 
of blacks in the 1930s. By 1935, it boasted a circulation of upward the black masses who, bent 
low under the Depression, sought some ray of hope.”116  
Not all papers shifted, however, and no small argument can be made regarding media 
compromise. That is, while the largest papers sometimes displayed an independent streak, others 
still were reliant on Republican Party patronage to remain afloat. Booker T. Washington, for 
example, often paid newspaper editors to release favorable coverage of himself and the GOP.
117
 
Jordan (2001) argues that while Washington did not exert “complete control over the black 
press,” he used his clout to influence coverage.118 As a result, Jordan writes, “the balance between 
protest and accommodation was decidedly tipped toward the latter, in part because of coercion 
from outside.”119 
In addition to articulating “New Negro” sentiments to a new generation of black 
urbanites, black media also played a role in exposing the Republican Party’s lack of action on 
lynching in the South, specifically, even as it held the reins of power in Washington, its failure to 
pass federal anti-lynching legislation. This became a galvanizing issue for northern black 
urbanites, who abhorred this treatment of their southern brethren, and southern migrants, who 
knew all too well the horrors of white mob violence. Northern white politicians (in both parties) 
were persistent in passing legislation, but the alliance of lily-white Republicans and Southern 
Democrats made it impossible. That this was based on bipartisan obstructionism only further 
undermined the black relationship with Republicans, and created a crosscutting issue that no 
doubt played a role during the priming phase.  
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Crosscutting Issue  
 
The menace of lynch mobs loomed large over the early-twentieth century America. 
Thousands of black citizens found themselves at the mercy of mob-justice, which provided no 
due process, flimsy reasoning, and a brutal end. For years in the South, the specter took on the 
image of the three wise monkeys: speak no, see no, and hear no evil. Southern politicians, local 
law enforcement, intellectuals, and common folk would deny their occurrence, act as if they had 
never witnessed them, and play as if they’d never heard of these incidents. When the number of 
victims increased, and became too big a problem to ignore, justifications for mob-violence relied 
on black “criminality.” In the North, as reports became prevalent, federal politicians began 
pushing for a national law that would compel criminal prosecution against the perpetrators of 
mob lynching. 
Congressman Leonidas Dyer of Missouri introduced his federal anti-lynching bill in 
1918. This bill (1) defined a “mob” (2) held state and governmental subdivisions criminally 
responsible for failing to protect the victims of mob violence (3) held perpetrators of mob 
violence federally responsible (4) forced the county in which the victim was lynched to 
monetarily compensate the victim’s family and (5) established the treaty rights of aliens.120   
The Dyer bill, however, was fashioned from a previous anti-lynching bill championed by 
Senator George Hoar. In 1901, Hoar introduced a bill that would “protect citizens of the United 
States against lynching in default of protection by the States” and held “murderous” lynch mobs 
liable by trial by any “circuit court of the United States having jurisdiction in the place where 
such putting to death occurs.”121  The bill was provocative and immediately ignited states’ rights 
debates. Furthermore, its “death penalty for lynchers” clause elicited its fair amount of attention 
from the press. It was also met with objections on the grounds of efficacy. Many were simply 
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unconvinced that this unconventional solution would provide the results needed to justify a 
transformation of the constitutional relationship between the federal government and the states. It 
ultimately failed, and while it provided a template for future legislation, it also primed opponents 
with a set of talking points and constitutional arguments that were continually successful. 
Numerically, there were enough Southern Democrats and skittish Republicans to stifle its 
passage. This was a precursor to similar coalitions that defeated these anti-lynching measures. 
In 1922, Congressman Ira G. Hersey refused to be “blackmailed” into supporting the 
Dyer bill. As a staunch Maine Republican, conventional wisdom would lead one to assume that 
Hersey would be a guaranteed vote in the affirmative. This was not so. And his sentiments on the 
entire matter, even as most Northern Republicans voted for the Dyer measure, were prescient. 
Hersey once exclaimed, “We as a party owe the colored people nothing, and I for one refuse to be 
politically blackmailed.”122 On the floor of the House, Hersey made constitutional arguments 
against the Dyer bill, echoing Southern Democrats, and annoying his colleagues. In a floor 
speech, he cited the Volstead prohibition measure as a prime example of the Dyer bill’s ineptness 
and unconstitutionality. He stated, “The Supreme Court said in substance the states have a right to 
enact their own criminal laws. They have the police power, and it is not only their duty but it is 
their exclusive duty to enforce the police powers under the Constitution.”123  As a result, he said, 
Congress went about passage of a constitutional amendment to make the manufacture and sell of 
liquor a federal offense. It was passed. Thus a federal enforcement code was created. The Dyer 
bill was different. It was “not a resolution of Congress submitting the twentieth amendment to the 
people of the Nation, making lynching a Federal offense in every state in the Union, and 
authorizing Congress to enact a federal code for the enforcement of the amendment.”124  Instead, 
the Dyer bill was attempting to possess the same power of the Eighteenth Amendment, without 
the passage of a new amendment. Until a Twentieth Amendment is passed, said Hersey, Congress 
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“has no power whatever” to enact the Dyer bill. He cited Unites States v. Harris (1883), where 
the Court ruled that Congress could not make individual acts a federal offense without a 
constitutional amendment, as a guarantee against the “exertion of arbitrary and tyrannical power 
on the part of the government and legislature of the state.”125 He also claimed that if “there are 
more Negroes lynched than whites, it is because of certain monstrous crimes committed by the 
Negro that arouse the blood of the white race.”126 Indeed, a statement one might justifiably 
confuse with that of a Southern Democrat. Hersey may have been one of just a few Republicans 
to vote against the Dyer bill in the House that year, but his vote, arguments, and general 
sentiments toward blacks was a harbinger of the Hoover Administration and increased 
Republican racial conservatism.  
The Negro Almanac, using data collected by the Tuskegee Institute, shows that between 
1882 and 1962, nearly 3500 blacks were lynched.
127
 It also shows a significant drop-off in 
lynching post-1920, just as federal anti-lynching legislation had been proposed. Was this a 
coincidence or the result of a real decrease in mob violence? A rift among black elites on the 
definition of ‘lynching’ may also explain why the purported drop in mob violence during the 
1920s was not universally accepted (and why Republicans were not off the hook).  
The importance of defining ‘lynching’ had implications beyond the quarrelling among 
reformers. As long as advocates for anti-lynching measures were on separate wavelengths, 
southern apologists could rely on promoting their own explanation for lynching, and it seldom 
had much to do with the crimes of the mob. Instead, southern politicians and newspaper editors 
focused on black criminality. As a tactic, this was used to convince “white reformers sensitive to 
the plight of southern blacks” of “the truth of black villainy.”128  Black crimes, among them rape 
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and theft, they reasoned, were an assault on entire communities. Thus, the community justified 
extralegal measures, as they felt threatened.  
Walter White, a prominent figure of the NAACP, promoted a broad definition of 
lynching. As he saw it, conditions in the South and the southern psyche prevented any limiting 
explanation.  He reasoned by observing the various tactics of the white mob in persecuting 
southern blacks. If not hanged, the accused could be killed by other measures, and then their 
remains would be mutilated. These were certainly ‘lynch’-like activities, he charged. In other 
cases where a black is tried legally, but unfairly, his execution should effectively count as a 
lynching. The ultimate expectation was that one could only estimate the number of unjust 
murders of blacks, thus a count of all these occurrences, regardless of their characteristics, was 
justified.
129
  
It goes without saying that many disagreed with his assessment. First, if this 
consideration was to be pursued, was not the value of lynching statistics grossly inflated? In other 
words, if most considered ‘lynching’ to be the rare incident of a white mob hanging an accused 
black, then the inclusion of all “unjust” murders would simply inflate the real number of 
lynchings. Advocates couldn’t use these “catch-all” statistics, opponents argued, to justify anti-
lynching legislation. It would be tantamount to fraud.   
The Tuskegee Institute, a prominent black organization founded by Booker T. 
Washington, also disagreed with White and the NAACP.  It preferred to define lynching as “an 
activity in which persons not officers of the law, in open defiance of the law, administer 
punishment by death to an individual for an alleged offense or to an individual with whom some 
offense has been associated.”130  The exclusion of officers of the law and other murders was a 
major point of contention between the two heavyweight organizations, and that would have a 
dramatic effect on how lynchings were being counted.  
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It is doubtless that a limited definition of lynching becoming the universally recognized 
function of newspaper editors and southern apologists had a great effect. After all, if lynchings 
were becoming rarer, what was the need for a federal law? This may explain why the NAACP 
was so tenacious in its effort to broaden the definition. If achieved, this “catch-all” might reveal 
the real picture: that mob violence wasn’t decreasing, just becoming more sophisticated. 
Additionally, the forms of killing were diversifying, so much so that a limited explanation of 
lynching would not count these incidents. The dueling between Tuskegee and the NAACP only 
served to elongate the dilemma, allowing southerners to exploit a conservative count of lynching, 
and provide a decent rationale for why reformers were exaggerating the problem. Nonetheless, no 
matter who counted what, black elites were convinced that federal anti-lynching legislation was a 
necessity, and increasingly it looked as if Republicans were dragging their feet.  
The Dyer bill would eventually pass the House, 230-119.
131
 Its path toward becoming law 
stalled in the Senate, due in no small order to the Republican chairman of the Judiciary 
Committee, William E. Borah. The Idaho Republican opposed the legislation on constitutional 
grounds, and was the single most influential vote on the measure. Additionally, the other 
Republicans who sat on the committee all hailed from states (CT, RI, ID, IO, SD, NE) with small 
black constituencies, and therefore were under little pressure to vote in the affirmative.
132
 As a 
result, the Dyer bill was shuffled from the docket, delayed until after the election of 1922, and 
effectively stifled. Moorfield Storey, leader of the NAACP, expressed disappointment at the lack 
of veracity coming from Republican senators. In Crisis magazine, the NAACP publicly listed 
every Republican who did not respond to quorum on the measure and warned Republican 
senators that if the bill was not passed in the post-election session, they would consider it as a 
broken promise to blacks.
133
 After the election, where the GOP lost eight seats in the Senate, 
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things only got worse. When the Dyer bill was reintroduced, Southern Democrats threatened to 
filibuster if Republicans tried to pass it during the lame-duck session. Ultimately, the caucus 
relented and abandoned the bill. The subsequent outcry was immense. Ernest Harvier of the New 
York Times described the black response in an “open letter” to the Senate: 
The action of the Republicans in passing the bill was regarded by their negro 
followers as belated and the delay over its adoption as an evidence of bad faith. 
Hence their defection last year from the Republicans in New York City and in 
many other cities throughout the country and this year in Chicago, Kansas City 
and Philadelphia.
134
 
The bipartisan nature of this failed effort was not lost on black media either. In an 
editorial titled “More Sectional Than Partisan”, the Defender noted the regional effect at play in 
votes against the Dyer bill. In reality, they wrote, the picture was more nuanced than Republicans 
‘yea’ and Democrats ‘nay’. They found that in all but two cases, affirmative votes for the bill in 
the House, regardless of party, were to be found in the North. Below the Mason-Dixon Line, the 
opposite was true, again, irrespective of party. This trend was seen as an encouragement. “That 
the new Northern Democrats in Congress could not be whipped into line by the representatives of 
the Southern oligarchy,” they wrote, “is a favorable sign and hopeful indication.”135 
Jenkins, Peck, and Weaver (2009) argue that this ordeal “marked the beginning of black 
disaffection with the GOP and foreshadowed their outright revolt in the 1930s.” Furthermore, 
“perhaps the Dyer bill’s greatest legacy was in helping to reduce blacks’ allegiance to the 
Republican Party.”136 In their conclusion on the subject, they write: 
By the end of the 1920s, blacks had no alliance and were not “captured” (in Paul 
Frymer’s language). As Congressional Democrats reemerged in the North in 
1930s, thanks to FDR’s coattails, they would be poised to be the “friendly party” 
to blacks, a title they could not compete for given their small numbers in the 
1920s.  Related to shifting black party alliances, the party line votes in the Dyer 
years would become more bipartisan, with more and more Democratic sponsors 
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and supporters of anti-lynching legislation, much to the chagrin of the Southern 
wing of the party.
137
 
 
The cleavage issue of anti-lynching legislation had an immeasurable effect on black 
perception of the Republican Party. This is a key characteristic of the priming phase: a salient 
wedge that contributes to shifting allegiances within both parties. Indeed, it became an issue that 
helped push blacks away from an indifferent GOP and within the grasps of an emerging 
Democratic presence in the North. The only natural progression was for a cataclysmic short term 
force to break blacks free. This turning point came in the form of Franklin Roosevelt and his New 
Deal coalition, an acceptable (and popular) alternative for black political allegiance.  
Turning Point  
 
Short Term Forces: New Deal 
 
The presidential election of 1936 marked a great shift among blacks and their party 
allegiance. While the unpopular Herbert Hoover was still able to rely on black loyalty in 1932, 
due in no small order to skepticism toward the New York Brahmin Democrat Franklin Roosevelt, 
the relatively beneficial implantation of New Deal policies had an effect on the vote four years 
later. Alf Landon, a listless Kansas Republican governor, inspired few, particularly on-the-fence 
blacks. Rhetorically, Landon generically espoused a belief in equality and condemned lynching, 
but his words rang hollow for many in light of the tangible gains they had received as a result of 
Roosevelt’s policies.138  
Emmett J. Scott, secretary of Howard University in 1936, penned an editorial in 
Opportunity magazine on these gains. He wrote, “the largest number of colored men holding 
worthwhile political positions is now assembled in Washington, and representative Negroes are 
holding important positions also throughout the country…these positions are mainly of an 
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entirely different kind from those usually provided by the Republican Party,” continuing, 
“contrasting these appointments with the Republican policy of appointing three or four colored 
men at salaries averaging about $4,500 is altogether to the credit of the Democratic 
administration.”139 
In a nationwide address entitled “Roosevelt Replaces Hovel With Homes,” prominent 
Black Cabinet member Mary McLeod Bethune credited the Democratic administration with 
pouring millions of federal funds into “the construction and repair of school buildings for Negro 
youth; [and] other millions went to keep open schools that had been forced to close through loss 
of local support.” 140  Furthermore, Roosevelt created the Division of Negro Affairs, which 
provided large sums of assistance for black students, and according to Bethune, would benefit 
fifty thousand young blacks.
141
 
Robert Weaver, another member of the Black Cabinet, gave a speech to the NAACP 
touting the accomplishments of the administration. He claimed that 390,000 blacks were 
employed on Works Progress Administration (WPA) projects, 10,000 black children were cared 
for through the WPA nursery schools, 5,000 black teachers were on the federal payroll, and a 
third of federally-funded housing units were earmarked for black residents.
142
  
Nancy Weiss in Farewell to the Party of Lincoln (1983) makes an important distinction 
regarding black perceptions and the New Deal. The initiative was not without its flaws and many 
of the programs had unintended consequences. For example, the National Industrial Recovery Act 
(NIRA) authorized the president to issue executive orders establishing some 7000 industrial 
cartels, which restricted output and forced wages and prices above market levels. The minimum 
wage regulations made it illegal for employers to hire people who were not worth the minimum 
because they lacked skills. As a result, thousands of blacks, particularly in the South, were 
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estimated to have lost their jobs.
143
 Furthermore, Roosevelt still refused to publicly enforce 
federal anti-lynching legislation. His trepidation on the matter was probably only neutralized 
because Landon displayed a similar sentiment. In any event, while blacks knew they weren’t 
receiving the best deal, they were appreciative to simply receive a deal. The point wasn’t that 
they were being subjected to discrimination in New Deal programs. Instead, it was that they were 
receiving something, which ultimately kept their families from starving.
144
 Richard W. Thomas 
(1992) implicitly echoes this assertion when assessing the declining performance of Republicans 
among blacks. The party “lacked a political and economic program containing a live issue 
attractive to hard-pressed urban blacks.”145 Conversely, Roosevelt and his New Deal had this 
allure in spades.  
Landon would go on to receive the lowest support among blacks in Republican Party 
history. His 28 percent support was a drubbing, and unfortunately for Republicans, a trendsetting 
episode.
146
 Roosevelt, on the other hand, saw drastic increases in his support within black wards 
across the nation. Table 1 shows his black ward percentage increases, 1932 to 1936, in eight 
major cities: 
 
Table 1 
City Percent Increase from 1932 to 1936 
Cleveland +250 
Philadelphia +157 
Cincinnati +126 
Detroit +114 
Chicago +132 
Harlem (NYC) +60 
Pittsburgh +81 
Knoxville +89 
Source: Weiss, Nancy Joan. Farewell to the Party of Lincoln: Black Politics in the Age of FDR. Princeton 
University Press, 1983: 206.  
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These percentages would increase again in 1940.
147
 Nationally, 1936 was a banner year 
for black political shift. It did not, however, reflect the depth of black allegiance to Democrats. 
While blacks turned the corner in favor of the New Deal, they did not uniformly support 
Democrats to the same extent at local and statewide levels.  
Grimshaw (1992) finds that the black electorate in Chicago “was the only group that did 
not shift its allegiance, in either local or national elections.”148 He writes, “black voters sought 
representation and empowerment as well as favors from the Democratic Party,” and while the 
New Deal tried to address black socioeconomic concerns, it “failed to address their [black] 
marginal social status.” 149  The following chart shows the gap in the level of support for 
Democratic candidates at the mayoral and presidential levels in Chicago black wards: 
Figure 5 
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During the 1930s, black support for mayoral and presidential elections was 
indistinguishable. However, when FDR committed the national Democratic Party to the promise 
of racial equality, and local machines neglected to make a similar pledge, different levels of 
support became apparent.
150
 Black voters distinguished the local Democratic machine’s “raw 
deal” from the national New Deal. Grimshaw credits the “politically active middle-class” of 
blacks in the “black belt” in Chicago for being able to make this distinction (and form the 
electoral “contradiction” of voting Democratic nationally and less predictably locally). He coins 
this pattern as “divergence”.151 He argues that because this contradiction existed, Chicago blacks 
were not fully realigned, because the local Democratic political system did not create the proper 
conditions to take advantage of blacks’ then-loose (and dying) association with Republicans 
nationally.  
Banner-Haley (1998) also found a class-based division in 1930s and 40s Philadelphia. 
For many black Philadelphians, being a part of the Republican Party was more than just the 
membership, it was a status symbol.
152
 Upper-and-middle class black professionals, lawyers and 
businessmen, were less drawn to the lure of New Deal economic policies, and the Democratic 
Party had yet to successfully make its case otherwise. Similarly, well-off blacks on the west side 
of Detroit continued to vote Republican both nationally and locally until the late 1940s. Class 
division, while not clear-cut, did “exert some influence on black voting patterns.”153 
This “divergence” and class-division phenomenon illustrates why the story of group 
realignment does not begin and end with the turning point. Borrowing from Key (1959), the 
“slowness” with which groups reach political homogeneity may be in part explained by the 
“management of political leadership.” In 1936, lower-class blacks had already become 
susceptible to this management, in the form of New Deal programs. Those who were not swayed 
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by job opportunities and housing may have come around once Democrats began speaking more 
liberally on race issues. Nevertheless, in order to insure the permanent defection of poor blacks, 
as well as win over the skeptical upper-and-middle classes, prospects had to also come in 
different forms. Particularly, the chance at elective office and leadership posts within the party 
structure. Black self-representation and political incorporation are just two features that explain 
how turning point black Republican defection became permanent Democratic coalition votes 
across class, locally, statewide, and nationally. These factors are a part of the settling phase.  
Settling Phase  
Solidifying Pull Factors: Local Machines  
 
The specific role of the New Deal record in the conversion of blacks to the Democratic 
Party is not agreed upon universally. Harvard Sitkoff (1978) argues that the positive racial record 
of the first FDR administration did cause change.
154
 Weiss (1983) claims that support for 
Roosevelt happened in spite of the hostility of New Deal programs toward blacks. Both scholars 
make compelling cases, but these features do not have to be mutually exclusive. Additionally, 
neither emphasizes the dramatic role the local political machine played in keeping blacks 
converted.  
Local political machines (and party systems) must be included when describing the 
settling phase. Merton (1968) observes that the key structural function of a machine is to 
“organize, centralize and maintain in good working condition the scattered fragments of power 
which are present dispersed through our political organization.”155 He writes: 
The machine welds its link with ordinary men and women by elaborate networks 
of personal relations. Politics is transformed into personal ties. The precinct 
captain “must be a friend to every man, assuming if he does not feel sympathy 
with the unfortunate, and utilizing in his good works the resources which the boss 
puts at his disposal.” The precinct captain is forever a friend in need. In our 
prevailingly impersonal society, the machine, through its local agents, fulfills the 
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important social function of humanizing and personalizing all manner of 
assistance to those in need.
156
 
 
For marginalized groups, such as the newly immigrated Irish, Italians, Polish, Catholics, 
as well as blacks, the machine served as the party system in cities across the country. In the early 
twentieth century, “bossism” was an inescapable reality. Boston, Chicago, New York, Lexington, 
Cincinnati, Jersey City, Philadelphia, Pittsburgh, Memphis, Kansas City, New Orleans, and 
Albany all sustained a political machine. In most of these cities, black citizens had several 
disadvantages. First, they were too small a population (particularly in Northern cities) for the 
machine to take much notice of their concerns. In Albany, for example, the political rulers paid 
“minimal attention to the black community” as Catholics were the dominant constituency.157 In 
his book You’re The Boss (1947), Bronx boss Ed Flynn never even mentions his black 
constituents when explaining the process of forming a “well-rounded ticket” for an election. This 
was clear because the Jewish, Italian, and Irish Catholic groups were the largest portions of the 
county. In Boston, “treatment of African-Americans merited little attention from either politicians 
or the press”.158 Blacks were just too small a population to matter. Second, they often resided in 
Democratically controlled (read: hostile) cities, which meant that the machines were even less 
inclined to serve them. In Lexington, Boss Whallen made no attempts to court black voters (even 
as they were a sizable group in the electorate), instead using intimidation tactics to question and 
challenge their right to register at election time.
159
 Reynolds (1936) notes the use of the police in 
New Orleans to enforce “minute regulations concerning assistance to illiterate voters.” 160 
Needless to say, the Machine used this tactic to disenfranchise those black voters who were brave 
enough to even attempt to vote. As a result, blacks found themselves shut out of the political 
sphere and the patronage system.  
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When blacks began to migrate to northern cities, conflict developed between them and 
the poor Irish, who were also cast as societal lowlies. Nevertheless, during the 20s and 30s, black 
voter presence in many cities began to take shape. Political dissent among black elites and media, 
however, found itself stunted on two fronts. First, in cities dominated by Republicans, popular 
resentment toward the GOP could have been tempered (particularly if the local party would have 
none of it). In 1920s Chicago, even while activist women’s groups, male elites, and the local 
press were challenging the Republican Party, black voters still overwhelmingly supported the 
GOP ticket.
161
 After all, Republican Big Bill Thompson was “perhaps the first urban politician to 
have seen the potential strength of the black vote and openly courted it.”162 For example, in 1919, 
his “alliance with blacks proved central.”163 Additionally, Thompson’s political power, it could be 
argued, was in part based on support from Chicago’s Black Belt. Second, in cities where hostile 
Democrats ruled, mustering popular approval for national allegiance with Democrats (or simply 
breaking from Republicans), may have proven an arduous task. Because of this, black voters 
could only realign when local Democrats took their “window of opportunity” in Republican-
dominated cities; and formerly antagonistic Democratic machines were either replaced or evolved 
on issues related to race.  
Some machines proved the exception to the rule. In fact, in Memphis and Kansas City, 
black voters became an active class in the machine, a shocking development, particularly in 
southern city Memphis. Tucker (1980) cites the unique situation in Ed Crump’s Memphis during 
the early twentieth century. Crump’s machine “provided security for blacks and also delivered a 
better share of city services and less brutal police treatment than did white rule in those Southern 
cities where blacks did not vote. So blacks followed the machine loyally and voted as they were 
instructed.”164 As a result, “few pockets of resistance emerged.”165 Tom Pendergast in Kansas 
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City followed the same tradition, expanding his machine with “handouts of food, fuel, and 
clothing, as well as aid in finding employment and help when in trouble with the law” to blacks in 
the West Bottoms.
166
 In these peculiar instances, machine replacement or evolution would not be 
needed. Black voter efficacy seemed to have at least marginally existed, and because blacks had 
already become accustomed to voting Democratic, activist and media persuasion was less a 
necessity. In Boston, however, realignment conditions required the advent of bosses like Michael 
Curley, who unlike previous Democratic Boston mayors “encouraged black voter 
participation.”167  
Conditions changed for blacks in major city machines during the New Deal. Beginning as 
early as 1932 (and in earnest in the late 30s), local Democratic machines began incorporating 
blacks into their newly formed coalition. In Philadelphia and Detroit, blacks were increasingly 
able to obtain political jobs through the local Democratic party which the Republicans had denied 
them.
168
 Democratic slating of black candidates in black wards also served to engender black 
political efficacy, fostering group pride, and again, contrasting favorably against the old lily-
white Republican regimes.  
In Black Politics, Hanes Walton, Jr. maintains that 1930s black professionals (many of 
whom were still Republican-in-name) were “eager for new prestige.” 169   This ambition 
precipitated the relationship between these (mostly) men and white political bosses. They 
“acquired the trappings of Anglo-Saxon political behavior” to achieve status, corral votes, and 
distribute tangible rewards given by the machine. In turn, the Democratic political machine 
“filled part of the demand for black participation.”170 This quid pro quo system not only served to 
convert middle-and-upper-class blacks, but also settle them into the dominant party. After all, 
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blacks and their leaders needed the Democratic organization as much as the organization needed 
them.
171
 
In Chicago, from 1932 on, many (if not most) black politicians “jumped upon the 
Democratic bandwagon.”172 This was a telling development, as once the local Democratic Party 
became dominant; many calculated that the only way to play the game would be to be a 
Democrat. Machine Democrats began appointing former-Republican blacks like Michael Sneed, 
as Democrats, to committee seats. In 1934, black Democrat Arthur Mitchell ran against (and 
unseated) loyal black Republican stalwart Oscar De Priest in a race for Congress. Soon after, 
William Dawson, another black Republican, switched allegiances and was appointed Democratic 
committeeman from the Second Ward.
173
 The trend became clear (particularly with the Mitchell 
victory), black politicians were now embracing the “other” party, becoming a part of national 
Democratic politics for the first time, signaling a real shift in group political alignment. RW 
Gordon (1969) writes: 
Mitchell's nomination heralded the beginning of Negro participation in national 
Democratic Party politics. Before Mitchell, no Negro Democrat had won a 
nomination for Congress… Although a majority [of blacks] voted for De Priest in 
the congressional elections of 1934 and 1936, many of Chicago's Negroes 
demonstrated a shift toward the Democrats in the aldermanic and county 
elections.  
 
While Chicago blacks did not overwhelmingly support the candidacy of Mitchell, and their 
realignment was slower to develop than the national black trend would indicate, the fact that 
black politicians began to both see opportunity in the Democratic Party and to actually be elected 
is significant.  
The election of Charles C. Diggs, the first black Democrat to be voted to the Michigan 
Senate, opened a “new era in northern urban politics.”174 Thomas (1992) writes: 
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Based upon the emergence of a new political coalition made up of labor, white 
ethnics, liberal Democrats, and blacks…Diggs became a model of progressive 
black political leadership unprecedented in Detroit’s black political history.175 
Diggs would oversee a sea change in black Detroit political behavior in the 1940s, forming the 
Michigan Federation of Democratic Clubs (MFDC), and helping to elect black Democrats to the 
state house and Detroit Common Council.
176
  
Black city politicians in the 1930s and 40s began abandoning the Republican label. As 
the machines began to evolve (or be replaced), Democratic bosses began making an effort to 
court black voters. They did so strategically. First, they more openly welcomed blacks in the 
patronage system. More importantly, they placated activist elites, media elites, and popular will 
by appointing blacks to represent black wards. When the Chicago Democratic machine finally 
deigned to court black politicians, and these men accepted their overtures, settling was in motion. 
By the 1950s, Chicago boss Richard J. Daley and his Democratic organization made it a priority 
to be “a good deal more responsive to blacks…giving them an increasing share of nominations 
and appointments.”177 
Machines helped to accelerate the “registration and voting of blacks” and facilitated 
“black accommodation to the promised land [cities].”178 Nonetheless, Walton (1972) questions 
the value of black political rewards. He finds that about 85% of these tangible benefits were 
marginal and non-significant.
179
 Blacks received only “bare necessities” like low-paying jobs, 
poor food, and poor housing.
180
 They were still, however, increasingly voting Democratic. 
Illustrated below in Table 2, black voters in Philadelphia showed increasing allegiance through 
three consecutive election years on three separate levels: nationally, statewide, and locally.  
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Table 2 
President             Governor Mayor 
 
Kenneth Kusmer (1976) provides insight into black urban psychology that in some ways 
mirrors Weiss’s view on the success of the New Deal. He claims that while blacks sought better 
opportunities, they did not necessarily define opportunity solely on economic terms.
181
 He writes, 
“The desire for better schools, recreational facilities, and the need to escape the hard, humdrum 
conditions and poor accommodations on plantation and farm,” also played a role in assessing 
progress. On this front, even going back to the days of Boss Crump, machines were fairly 
effective.  
Old Loyalty Base 
 
 
Old loyalists were still a force in the 40s and 50s. While their numbers were dwindling, 
they still embodied a last gasp of hope for Republican leaders desperate to get back in the good 
graces of black voters. Unfortunately, these loyalists were a dying generation; victims of old age, 
diminishing clout, and outright conversion. Weiss (1983), measuring party affiliation by age 
among black leaders, uncovers a stark (albeit unsurprising) result: About 60% of black leaders 
born in the 1890s were Republican in 1942. That number drops to 57% if born in the 1900s. 
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Finally, it falls more dramatically to 29% if born in the 1910s.
182
 By the 40s and 50s, these 
loyalists (born between 1890 and 1910) were largely middle-age voters, and as the children and 
grandchildren of slaves, it just proved more difficult for them to support the Democratic Party.
183
  
At the aggregate, black support for the Republican Party ranged between 20 and 40  
percent from 1936 to 1960.  
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Data collected from cities with large black concentrations also show Republican support  
(1948 to 1956) ranging between 20 and 40 percent.  
These numbers would show a remarkable drop in 1964 (triggering a sealed realignment), 
which will be discussed later.  
If Detroiter Charles Diggs was the voice of the emerging black Democrat, Sara Pelham 
Speaks articulated the sheer desperation of loyalists. Ms. Speaks, member of a prominent black 
family in Detroit, refused to believe that blacks were lost to Republicans forever. The task, 
instead, was for the Party to demonstrate a more emphatic understanding of the needs of 
Depression-ravaged blacks.
184
 While addressing a group of black Republicans in Chicago, she 
introduced a doctrine of sorts. A set of principles that the Republican Party needed to adopt in 
order to regain black loyalty: 
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They must protect the lives of blacks from mob rule; business leaders should hire 
blacks in areas in which they have been barred; child labor should be abolished; 
realize that the sentimental appeal to Reconstruction is passé in light of the 
current social and economic struggles of blacks.
185
  
 
She also criticized Roosevelt for his lack of support for anti-lynching legislation and the 
New Deal’s perpetuation of an “inferior status in American life.”186 Her words did not resound. 
Republican leaders had no intention of “radicalizing” their agenda, and blacks still preferred 
Roosevelt. Even Joe Louis, famed heavyweight boxing champion, who campaigned on behalf of 
Republicans in the 30s and 40s, could not resonate.  
Nonetheless, loyalists are important to note for a few reasons. First, they represent (in 
numbers and votes) that an observable percentage of the group are still wedded to the old regime. 
From 1936 to 1960, about 20 to 40 percent of the national black vote was still going to 
Republicans. Locally, that range looked similar (see again the previous figure) Second, they in 
many ways articulate the shortcomings of the new regime in an attempt to court their brethren. 
Black Republicans spent an inordinate amount of time spelling out the flaws of the New Deal, 
Roosevelt, the racist Democrats, and prejudicial unionists. Their mistake was in assuming that 
these costs outweighed the perceived gains. Additionally, they underestimated the influence of 
local machines and group dependency on the benefits these organizations afforded. Third, when 
their numbers noticeably convert at the polls, it is one of the more significant developments of a 
sealed realignment. High (and consistent) defection rates among the old guard, particularly after 
an election with powerful short-term forces, are no accident of nature. They help to signify an 
essential (and final) stage in group realignment.  
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Sealed Realignment  
 
Critical Election - 1964 
 
By 1964, among most blacks, the Republican Party had completely switched places with 
Democrats. The Grand Old Party had conspicuously moved rightward, socially, politically, and 
rhetorically. The presidential primary between Nelson Rockefeller and Barry Goldwater proved a 
power struggle between two competing factions within the party. Rockefeller represented old 
guard Eastern establishment Republicans: ideologically liberal, politically ambidextrous, and 
elitist. It was a dominant wing that had nominated every Republican presidential candidate since 
Wendell Willkie in 1940. Goldwater led a movement of young firebrand and housewife 
conservatives. They were tired of “Me Too” Republicanism and distrusted the establishment.187 
On a platform of liberty, state’s rights, and constitutionalism, the Goldwater movement would 
mobilize a wave of young conservatives, libertarians, and Southerners into Republican politics. 
He eventually won the 1964 GOP nomination and led his spirited new cohort into the fall 
campaign.  
Alas, Goldwater did not endear himself to black voters. His vote against the Civil Rights 
Act of 1964 was something of an unfortunate political Rorschach. Differing parties interpreted 
this vote based on their own inclinations.  Goldwater saw it as a vote against an unconstitutional 
overreach on the part of the federal government. Specifically, he disagreed with Titles II (which 
banned private businesses from discriminating on the basis of race) and VII (which banned 
private employers from discriminating on the basis of race).
188
 Eastern liberal Republicans saw it 
as yet another indicator of his rigid extremism. Southern whites viewed it as an invitation to his 
movement. After all, his avowals to state’s rights were music to the ears of Southern voters fed up 
with federal intrusion. Democrats like Lyndon Johnson exploited it as a means of defining him. 
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For blacks, it was the final slap in the face from the party they once fully embraced. With his 
vote, Goldwater invited the ire of black leaders, liberal Republicans, Democrats, and moderate 
voters. Even Dr. Martin Luther King deemed it necessary to publicly denounce the Republican 
nominee. He told the New York Times that if Goldwater was elected, the nation would erupt into 
“violence and riots, the like of which we have never seen before.”189  
President Lyndon Johnson, on the other hand, made great strides in sealing the 
relationship between black voters and the Democratic Party. Johnson had spearheaded the 
passage of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 (a bill that was once dead-in-the-water), courted black 
civil rights leaders, and promised further action on racial inequality. He was an unelected Texan 
with a scattershot civil rights record as a legislator, but compared to perceptions of Barry 
Goldwater, he was a warrior for equality. In 1965, he would send federal troops into Alabama, 
oversee the passage of the Voting Rights Act of 1965, and give a stirring speech before Congress, 
uttering “We Shall Overcome” (a key mantra of the Civil Rights movement) to a room full of 
Southern legislators.  
The short and long-term effects of the Goldwater/Johnson race are evident by a few 
measures. Beginning in 1964, Figure 7 illustrates a sharp (and sustained) drop in black 
Republican identification. During the 1950s, black Republican identifiers were close to 20% of 
black voters. By 1976, they were about 6%.  
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Figure 8 
 
 
Figure 8 shows black support for Republican presidential candidates taking a nosedive in 1964 
Figure 9 
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and remaining in the low-double digits.  
In the nine major cities measured in Figure 6, black support for the presidential candidate 
averaged above 20% (1948-56). Here, in Figure 9, the post-1964 average is 7%.  
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Weiss’s research on the middle-aged black cohort in 1942 found that about 60% of those born in 
the 1890s were still Republican. Those born in the 1900s were about 57%.
190
 These voters were 
the bedrock of the old loyalist base. Things changed post-1964. According the 1968 American 
National Elections Study, this cohort (those born 1888-1910) were now 75% Democratic 
identifiers.  
 
In 1968, the party identification of blacks in cities of 50,000 and more was 86.6 percent 
Democratic.
191
 
At the congressional level, black city wards continuously elected Democrats to represent 
them. The passage of the Voting Rights Act of 1965 assured, among other things, the elimination 
of vote delusion in minority communities. Election officials were no longer permitted to “crack” 
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minority communities into smaller, insignificant voting blocs or “submerge” them into broader, 
multiethnic districts. As a result of the law, majority-minority congressional districts began 
sending black (and later Latino) representatives to Congress. These new members were not only 
attaining election, but because their districts were drawn in such a way, their odds of reelection to 
the House were great. In fact, since World War II, black members of Congress have had greater 
longevity than the general membership.
192
  The Voting Rights Act not only provided safer 
districts for black representatives, but also created a boon in black membership in the House. 
Fully 71 percent of all black members serving came after 1970, nearly all of them Democrats.
193
  
Only about ten percent of the nation’s record 200 black office seekers ran as Republicans in 
1964.
194
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Even elite party politics took a major turn toward the Democratic Party in 1964. Black 
delegate seating at national conventions had always been something of an issue within both 
parties during the late nineteenth and early twentieth century. In fact, until 1936, no black 
delegate had ever been seated to the Democratic National Convention (DNC).
195
 However, 
starting in 1964, an observable spike in black delegates to the DNC and subsequent increases 
once again illustrates a trend.  
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DR Matthews and JW Prothro (1966) arrived at the conclusion that black Democratic bias was so 
overwhelming that “few of them are likely to shift permanently to the Republican camp in the 
foreseeable future.” Adding, “Their images of the parties are extraordinarily favorable to the 
Democrats and hostile to the GOP.”196 Undeniably, their prediction came true. Since 1964, Black 
Democratic party identification has not dropped below 75%, Republicans have yet to win more 
than 15% of the black vote, and black politicians have become an integral part of the party 
leadership. Today, a fifth of Democratic House members are black, two (of three) black senators 
are Democrat, and of course, the leader of the party became the first black President of the United 
States. Furthermore, eight in ten black local and statewide elected officials are Democrats.
197
 The 
data show that these numbers are a result of the sealed realignment election of 1964.  
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Conclusion 
 
Group allegiance to a party system is durable. Thus, the process of group realignment is 
both delicate and incremental. Still, shifts have (and do) occur. When a group is primed to think 
differently (and negatively) about their aligned party, opportunities exist for the opposition party 
to take advantage of short-term forces and absorb the group’s support. This immersion transpires 
as a result of a turning point election. Once the group has realigned, the new regime settles its 
coalition with tangible and symbolic dividends, assuring group demands are met. Finally, after 
another critical election, the last vestiges of the old regime all but vanish from the group and seal 
group realignment.  
The necessity of predictive power for the concept of critical realignment may be 
overrated. Most objective observers would acknowledge the empirical limitations of the theory 
and thus question its utility on that front. Moreover, making it work isn’t the same as showing it 
works. Attempting to prove the predictive power of critical realignment with elaborate (but 
hollow) empirics will not save the theory from its constraints. In the end, this may only expose it 
for what it is not, rather than concentrating on what it can be.  
The theoretical power of critical realignment has legs, particularly when applied to 
groups. While solely focusing on macro-level shifts in the party system may stump a researcher, 
group movements, especially when placed in a generalizable model, provide a bounty of content. 
For example, in 2014, discussions on broader party system realignment might prove premature. 
For the most part, at the aggregate, the parties are intact. Groups, however, are stirring with what 
Nichols would call “entropy”. The Tea Party faction has played an antagonist within the 
Republican Party for years, threatening to rock the party establishment, not unlike the old 
Goldwaterites of the 60s. Latinos, the most sought after group in the party system, have been 
taking slow but steady steps toward the Democratic Party for decades. White men are seemingly 
growing more conservative, single women more liberal, and Jews slightly more Republican. 
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Some of these groups more than others may be vulnerable to a critical election. Are Latinos 
priming? Have white evangelicals sealed with Republicans? Thinking of groups in terms of 
where they are in this process of realignment could prove helpful for scholars, grassroots 
activists, and party leaders, even if eventual outcomes are not being predicted.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
64 
 
Works Cited 
 
Aldrich, John H. Why Parties?: The Origin and Transformation of Political Parties in America. 
Chicago: U of Chicago, 1995. Print.  
Allen, R. L., and S. Hatchett. "The Media and Social Reality Effects: Self and System 
Orientations of Blacks." Communication Research 13.1 (1986): 97-123. Print.  
Allswang, John M. Bosses, Machines, and Urban Voters. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins UP, 1986. 
Print.  
Banner-Haley, Charles Pete. "The Philadelphia Tribune and the Persistence of Black 
Republicanism during the Great Depression." Pennsylvania History 65.2 (1998): 190-
202. Print.  
Beck, Paul. "A Socialization Theory of Partisan Realignment." The Politics of Future Citizens 
(1974): 406. Print.  
Bernstein, David E. Only One Place of Redress: African Americans, Labor Regulations, and the 
Courts from Reconstruction to the New Deal. Durham: Duke UP, 2001. Print.  
Blumenthal, Henry. "Woodrow Wilson and the Race Question." The Journal of Negro History 
48.1 (1963): 1-21. Print.  
Bolin, James Duane. Bossism and Reform in a Southern City: Lexington, Kentucky, 1880-1940. 
Lexington: U of Kentucky, 2000. Print.  
Boyd, Richard W. "Popular Control of Public Policy: A Normal Vote Analysis of the 1968 
Election." The American Political Science Review 66.2 (1972): 429. Print.  
Burnham, R. A. "Reform, Politics, and Race in Cincinnati: Proportional Representation and the 
City Charter Committee, 1924-1959." Journal of Urban History 23.2 (1997): 131-63. 
Print.  
Burnham, Walter Dean. Critical Elections and the Mainsprings of American Politics. New York: 
Norton, 1970. Print.  
 
 
65 
 
Burns, Adam. "Without Due Process: Albert E. Pillsbury and the Hoar Anti‐Lynching Bill." 
American Nineteenth Century History 11.2 (2010): 233-52. Print.  
Campbell, J. E. "Sources of the New Deal Realignment: The Contributions of Conversion and 
Mobilization To Partisan Change." Political Research Quarterly 38.3 (1985): 357-76. 
Print.  
Carmines, Edward G., and James A. Stimson. Issue Evolution: Race and the Transformation of 
American Politics. Princeton, NJ: Princeton UP, 1989. 21-23. Print.  
Coleman, Willi. "Architects of a Vision." African American Women and the Vote: 1837-1965. 
Amherst: Univ. of Massachusetts, 1997. 31. Print.  
Cowden, Jonathan A., and Rose M. McDermott. "Short-Term Forces and Partisanship." Political 
Behavior 22.3 (2000): 197-222. Print.  
Domke, D., D. V. Shah, and D. B. Wackman. "Media Priming Effects: Accessibility, Association, 
And Activation." International Journal of Public Opinion Research 10.1 (1998): 51. 
Print.  
Dorsett, Lyle W. The Pendergast Machine. New York: Oxford UP, 1968. Print.  
Erikson, Robert S., and Kent L. Tedin. "The 1928-1936 Partisan Realignment: The Case for the 
Conversion Hypothesis." The American Political Science Review 75.4 (1981): 951. Print.  
Fauntroy, Michael K. Republicans and the Black Vote. Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner, 2007. Print.  
Ferrell, Claudine L. Nightmare and Dream: Antilynching in Congress, 1917-1922. New York: 
Garland, 1986. Print.  
Franklin, V. P. "Voice of the Black Community: The Philadelphia Tribune." Pennsylvania 
History 51.4 (1984): 261-84. Print.  
Gordon, Rita Werner. "The Change in the Political Alignment of Chicago's Negroes During the 
New Deal." The Journal of American History 56.3 (1969): 584-603. Print.  
Grimshaw, William J. Bitter Fruit: Black Politics and the Chicago Machine, 1931-1991. 
Chicago: U of Chicago, 1992. Print.  
 
 
66 
 
Gurin, Patricia, Shirley Hatchett, and James S. Jackson. Hope and Independence: Blacks' 
Response to Electoral and Party Politics. New York: R. Sage Foundation, 1989. Print.  
Gustafson, Melanie S., Kristie Miller, and Elisabeth Israels. Perry. We Have Come to Stay: 
American Women and Political Parties, 1880-1960. Albuquerque: U of New Mexico, 
1999. Print.  
Hamilton, Charles V. The Black Experience in American Politics. New York: Putnam, 1973. 
Print.  
Hawkins, Robert P., and Suzanne Pingree. "Uniform Messages And Habitual Viewing: 
Unnecessary Assumptions In Social Reality Effects." Human Communication Research 
7.4 (1981): 291-301. Print.  
Hendricks, Wanda A. "African-American Women as Political Constituents in Chicago, 1913-
1915." We Have Come to Stay: American Women and Political Parties, 1880-1960. 
Albuquerque: U of New Mexico, 1999. 63. Print.  
Hendricks, Wanda A. "The Politics of Race." Gender, Race, and Politics in the Midwest: Black 
Club Women in Illinois. Bloomington: Indiana UP, 1998. 109. Print.  
Higginbotham, Evelyn B. "Clubwomen and Electoral Politics." African American Women and the 
Vote: 1837-1965. Amherst: Univ. of Massachusetts, 1997. 151. Print.  
Hixson, William B., Jr. "Moorfield Storey and the Defense of the Dyer Anti-Lynching Bill." The 
New England Quarterly 42.1 (1969): 65-81. Print.  
Hogan, Lawrence D. A Black National News Service Claude Barnett, the Associated Negro Press, 
and Afro-American Newspapers, 1919-1945. Madison, NJ: Fairleigh Dickinson UP, 
1978. Print.  
Howell, Susan E. "Short Term Forces and Changing Partisanship." Political Behavior 3.2 (1981): 
163-80. Print.  
Iyengar, Shanto, and Donald R. Kinder. News That Matters: Television and American Opinion. 
Chicago: U of Chicago, 1987. 63. Print.  
 
 
67 
 
Jackson, Byran O., Edward G. Carmines, and James A. Stimson. "Issue Evolution: Race and the 
Transformation of American Politics." Political Science Quarterly 105.1 (1990): 21-23. 
Print.  
Jenkins, Jeffery A., Justin Peck, and Vesla M. Weaver. "Between Reconstructions: Congressional 
Action on Civil Rights, 1891–1940." Studies in American Political Development 24.01 
(2010): 57. Print.  
Jordan, William G. Black Newspapers and America's War for Democracy: 1914-1920. Chapel 
Hill: Univ. of North Carolina, 2001. Print.  
Key, V. O. "Secular Realignment and the Party System." The Journal of Politics 21.02 (1959): 
198. Print.  
Key, V. O. "A Theory of Critical Elections." The Journal of Politics 17.01 (1955): 3. Print.  
Kusmer, Kenneth L. A Ghetto Takes Shape: Black Cleveland, 1870-1930. Urbana: U of Illinois, 
1976. Print.  
Ladd, Everett Carll. American Political Parties; Social Change and Political Response. New 
York: Norton, 1970. Print.  
Lepawsky, Rosalind. "Black Metropolis, A Study of Negro Life in a Northern City. By St. Glair 
Drake and Horace Cayton, (New York: Harcourt, Brace. 1945. Pp. Xxxiv, 809. $5.00.)." 
The Journal of Politics 8.04 (1946): 565. Print.  
Matthews, Donald R., and James W. Prothro. Negroes and the New Southern Politics. New York: 
Harcourt, Brace & World, 1966. Print.  
Mayhew, David R. Introduction. Electoral Realignments: A Critique of an American Genre. New 
Haven, CT: Yale UP, 2002. 5. Print.  
Meier, August, Elliott M. Rudwick, Francis L. Broderick, and Francis L. Broderick. Black Protest 
Thought in the Twentieth Century. Indianapolis: Bobbs-Merrill, 1971. Print.  
Merton, Robert King. Social Theory and Social Structure. New York: Free, 1968. Print.  
 
 
68 
 
Miller, Gary, and Norman Schofield. "Activists and Partisan Realignment in the United States." 
American Political Science Review 97.02 (2003): 254. Print.  
Nardulli, Peter F. "The Concept of a Critical Realignment, Electoral Behavior, and Political 
Change." The American Political Science Review 89.1 (1995): 11. Print.  
Nichols, Curt. "Reconsidering Realignment from a Systemic Perspective." Clio: The Newsletter 
of the Politics and History 19.2 (2009): 3. Print.  
Petrocik, John R., and Thad A. Brown. "Party System Structure and Electoral Realignments." 
Comparative Political Parties and Party Elites: Essays in Honour of Samuel J. 
Eldersveld. Ann Arbor: U of Michigan, 1999. 34-36. Print.  
Petrocik, John R. Party Coalitions: Realignment and the Decline of the New Deal Party System. 
Chicago: U of Chicago, 1981. Print.  
Ploski, Harry A., and James D. Williams. The Negro Almanac: A Reference Work on the African 
American. Detroit: Gale Research, 1983. Print.  
Reynolds, George M. Machine Politics in New Orleans 1897 - 1926. New York, NY: AMS, 
1968. Print.  
Robinson, Frank S. Machine Politics: A Study of Albany's O'Connells. New Brunswick, NJ: 
Transaction, 1977. Print.  
Salisbury, Robert H., and Michael Mackuen. "On the Study of Party Realignment." The Journal 
of Politics 43.02 (1981): 523. Print.  
Sartori, Giovanni. Parties and Party Systems: A Framework for Analysis. Colchester: ECPR, 
2005. Xv. Print.  
Schneider, Mark R. Boston Confronts Jim Crow, 1890-1920. Boston: Northeastern UP, 1997. 
Print.  
Sherman, Richard B. The Republican Party and Black America from McKinley to Hoover, 1896-
1933. Charlottesville: U of Virginia, 1973. Print.  
 
 
69 
 
Solomon, Mark I. The Cry Was Unity: Communists and African Americans, 1917-36. Jackson: U 
of Mississippi, 1998. Print.  
Tewksbury, David, and Dietram A. Scheufele. "Special Issue on Framing, Agenda Setting, & 
Priming: Agendas for Theory and Research." Journal of Communication 57.1 (2007): 9-
20. Print.  
Thomas, Richard Walter. Life for Us Is What We Make It: Building Black Community in Detroit, 
1915-1945. Bloomington: Indiana UP, 1992. Print.  
Travis, Toni-Michelle C. "Boston: The Unfinished Agenda." PS: Political Science & Politics 
19.03 (1986): 610-17. Print.  
Tucker, David M. Memphis since Crump: Bossism, Blacks, and Civic Reformers, 1948-1968. 
Knoxville: U of Tennessee, 1980. Print.  
Viswanath, K., and Pamela Arora. "Ethnic Media in the United States: An Essay on Their Role in 
Integration, Assimilation, and Social Control." Mass Communication and Society 3.1 
(2000): 41. Print.  
Waldrep, Christopher. "War of Words: The Controversy over the Definition of Lynching, 1899-
1940." The Journal of Southern History 66.1 (2000): 75-100. Print.  
Walter, David O. "Legislative Notes and Reviews: Proposals for a Federal Anti-Lynching Law." 
The American Political Science Review 28.3 (1934): 436-42. Print.  
Walton, Hanes. Black Politics: A Theoretical and Structural Analysis. Philadelphia: Lippincott, 
1972. Print.  
Walton, Hanes, Jr., and C. Vernon Gray. "Black Politics at the National Republican and 
Democratic Conventions, 1868-1972." Phylon (1960-) 36.3 (1975): 269-78. Print.  
Walton, Hanes, Jr. Invisible Politics: Black Political Behavior. Albany: State U of New York, 
1985. 81-82. Print.  
Walton, Hanes. The Negro in Third Party Politics. Philadelphia: Dorrance, 1969. Print.  
 
 
70 
 
Weber, Michael P. Don't Call Me Boss: David L. Lawrence, Pittsburgh's Renaissance Mayor. 
Pittsburgh, PA: U of Pittsburgh, 1988. Print.  
Weiss, Nancy J. Farewell to the Party of Lincoln: Black Politics in the Age of FDR. Princeton, 
NJ: Princeton UP, 1983. Print.  
Weiss, Nancy J. "The Negro and the New Freedom: Fighting Wilsonian Segregation." Political 
Science Quarterly 84.1 (1969): 61. Print.  
Wolgemuth, Kathleen L. "Woodrow Wilson and Federal Segregation." The Journal of Negro 
History 44.2 (1959): 158-73. Print.  
 
